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Japan and the USSR occupy neighboring positions geo-
graphically, yet stand vastly separated due to historical
and cultural reasons. A cloud of distrust permeates bi-
lateral relations. Since 19 78, greatly expanded Soviet
military forces in Northeast Asia have been added to this
unstable foundation. With such military power so close,
one might think Japan would be acutely concerned. This
paper examines the security perceptions of various Japanese
groups, the Japan-USSR economic linkages to the security
issue, and the extent which Japan's ongoing defense programs
represent a direct response to the Soviet "threat." The
US government would like to believe that Japan shares a
similar security outlook of the USSR. This study demonstrates
that marked differences currently exist, but suggests that
Japanese perceptions of land responses to) the Soviet
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I. INTRODUCTION
The relations between any two nations are dynamic and
driven by a complex set of factors. In the US, the theme
of the Soviet "threat" takes on certain meanings because
various Soviet actions over the years have been plainly aimed
at upsetting US foreign policy and establishing quick response
strike forces postured against deployed US military units,
as well as intercontinental missiles targeted against the
US homeland. But how does Japan view the Soviets? Because
Japan has been defensively aligned with the US since it
regained its sovereignty after World War II, too often Ameri-
cans think that Japan views Cor should view) the Soviets
through "red, white, and blue-tinted" glasses. However,
Japan is its own country, with its own set of interrelation-
ships and views of the USSR.
This paper will attempt to evaluate Japan ' s perceptions
of the Soviet "threat" by examining the views of various
Japanese communities, both within and outside of the govern-
ment. The economic relations between the two countries will
also be reviewed to determine the degree of dependency which
exists today, and projected prospects for the future.
Japan's security programs will then be analyzed to determine
what Japan is actually doing on defense matters and to what
degree these efforts appear to be a reaction to perceptions of

the Soviet "threat," responses to pressure from the US, or
other factors.
The purpose of this study is to help Americans gain a
clearer understanding and appreciation of the views of the
Japanese on this subject. The US has often been quick to
expect Japan to understand and accept US views, but only
when mutual understanding is achieved can the Japan-US
partnership best serve the interests of both countries.
To set the background for this study, the significant
historical events between Japan and the USSR will be re-
viewed because many of these issues have had lasting impact
on Japan-Soviet relations.
A. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF SIGNIFICANT ISSUES
One Western scholar summed up the history of Japan-
Soviet relations quite succinctly when he commented, "It
would be hard to name any pair of peoples less well suited
to get along with each other." The roots of this tenuous
relationship lie embedded in the common historical experiences
of these two neighbors. The bitterness emerging from some
of these events has lingered on and certain issues remain
unresolved even today. A review of the significant incidents
shared by these two nations may provide some insight into the
attitudes of each nation towards the other.
It is interesting that the first recorded contacts be-
tween the Japanese and Russians took place in the Kurile
Islands which today remain a central topic of controversy.
10

By 1739, Russian explorers had reached the Kuriles. As
subsequent expeditions gradually worked their way south
along the chain of islands, the Russians finally set foot
2on Hokkaido in 1778. When one recalls that these initial
contacts occurred in the midst of the Tokugawa period of
isolation in Japan, it is not hard to imagine how a xeno-
phobic outlook developed amongst the Japanese with regards
to Russia, though history does not support sufficient
Russian capability or intent to threaten Japan.
With increased exposure between the Japanese and Russians
(particularly in the northern areas) , territorial disagree-
ments soon arose. Neogtiations to resolve these disputes
resulted in the Treaty of Shimoda (1855) which recognized
the joint interests of both countries in Sakhalin and divided
possession of the island chain (at the eastern border of
the Sea of Okhotsk) between the islands of Etorofu and Uruppu,
This treaty was modified by the Treaty of St. Petersburg
(1875) which turned over the Kurile Islands to Japan in
return for recognition of Sakhalin as exclusively Russian
territory.
Expansionism struck a popular theme in the late 19th
century and Japan and Russia were both caught up in this
movement. The interest of these two countries in the Korean
Peninsula eventually led to the Russo-Japanese War (1904-
05) . Japan's surprise attack on the Russians at Port Arthur
likely left a permanent scar on the Russian psyche. Japan's
11

victory in this war was indeed impressive but did not
eliminate the Russian threat. By the time the fighting
ceased, Japan's forces were hard pressed to carry on the
war much longer. Their logistics pipeline was deteriorating
rapidly as supplies and ammunition approached critical levels.
Though Russia had experienced severe difficulties in support-
ing a war effort so far from its capital, its supply of
manpower would have proved almost inexhaustible. War demands
impacted more on the resources of the victor than the defeated.
Though Russia lost this match, Japan knew it was only a tem-
porary setback in Russia's rise to greater power.
When the Treaty of Portsmouth officially concluded the
war in 190 5, Russia was forced to cede southern Sakhalin to
Japan, give up former gains in Manchuria, and recognize
Japan's privileged status in Korea. Japan wasted little time
in taking absolute control of Korea (annexed in 19.10) which
in part, provided an effective means of deterring Russian
intervention in the area (though deterred, the events at
the conclusion of World War II suggest that Russia had not
lost interest in the Korean Peninsula),. Up through World
War I, various agreements were concluded between Japan and
Russia which for the most part dealt with recognizing spheres
of interest of each party. After the Bolshevik revolution
in Russia (hereafter referred to as the Soviet Union or
USSR) , Japan participated with other nations in the Siberian
intervention by deploying troops to Siberia in 1918. While
12

the other powers involved withdrew their troops by 1920,
Japanese troops remained within Siberia and the Soviet Far
East (mainly in northern Sakhalin) until 1925 when a with-
drawal was negotiated in return for oil and coal from
4Sakhalin.
Over the next decade, Japan's concern over the growing
Soviet ideological and military threat resulted in its
entering into the Anti-Comintern Pact with Germany (.1936) .
However, as World War II got underway and Japan saw the
potential of the Soviets, Americans, and British allying in
opposition to Japanese plans in East Asia, Japan moved to
improve its position by concluding a Neutrality Pact with
the USSR (1941) . The Soviets demonstrated their lack of
sincere support for the Neutrality Pact as early as October
1943 when Stalin informed US Secretary of State Hull at
an Allied Foreign Ministers conference that the USSR planned
to provide assistance against Japan after victory was achieved
over Germany
.
The fates of the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin were de-^
cided at Yalta in February 1945 when President Roosevelt
agreed to turn over the areas to the USSR for its entry into
the war against Japan. The Agreement stated that these
territories would be returned to the USSR in recognition of
the "treacherous attack of Japan in 1904." As one looks at
the pattern of Japan-Soviet relations since World War II,
these latter stages of the war appear to mark a major turning
13

point. Considering the Soviet tendency to respect others
according to their military prowess, it seems that Japan
had henceforth lost much of its bargaining position. In
the spring of 1945, Japan sought a "non-aggression" commit-
ment and economic support from the USSR. The Soviets made
no serious effort to deal with these requests. On August
9th, the same day that the second atomic bomb was dropped
on Japan, Soviet forces entered Manchuria. By August 14th,
Japan called for a halt to the hostilities.
Nearly complete exclusion of the Soviets from the Allied
Occupation of Japan greatly irritated the USSR. It must have
seemed that the war had barely ended and already the Ameri-
cans ignored Soviet concerns in their own backyard. Perhaps
this memory has encouraged the Soviets to still endeavor to
gain the influence over Japan that they were denied in the
Occupation years. With the USSR's direct influence over
Japan thwarted by the US, Soviet efforts appeared to have
been aimed at assisting the Japan Communist Party (JCPl gain
influence, lobbying for the removal of US forces from Japan,
and/or channeling Japan towards a neutralist position (i.e.,
7
remove any threat to the Soviet homeland)
.
The POW issue has had lasting memories for the Japanese.
Nearly 600,000 Japnese were taken into custody by the Soviets
as the war ended. More than a year passed before the first
Japanese POW's returned from the USSR (.December 1946).
Repatriation over the next six years proceeded in slow and
14

sporadic steps. By the early 1950' s, the Japanese government
estimated that 234,151 Japanese prisoners had died while
interned by the Soviets, 18,79 7 were listed as "missing,"
Q
and 17,637 remained imprisoned. From accounts of repatri-
ates, Japanese prisoners were extensively used as forced
labor (some consider the term "slave labor" more appropriate)
under bleak work conditions and were routinely subjected to
copious amounts of "educational" material espousing the
glories of the Communist system and the evils of US intentions.
The JCP apparently enjoyed some success in finding new re-
cruits from among the repatriates though probably not to
the degree hoped for by the Soviets, and certainly not com-
paring with the amount of anti-Soviet sentiment created in
Japan as a result of the POW issue.
The USSR refused to sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty
of 1951. Its main objectives centered around the lack of
guarantees that Japan could never again become an aggressor,
opposition to US forces stationed in Japan, and opposition
to the security agreement between Japan and the US . Even at
this time, the Soviets recognized the significance of the
straits around Japan. They recommended an amendment to the
Treaty to gain unrestricted use of the waters and straits
9
around Japan, which was disapproved.
When Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama came to power in
19 54, he actively pursued normalization of relations with
the USSR, even if it meant sidestepping central issues such
15

as the dispute over the Northern Territories. As a result,
diplomatic relations were reestablished in 1956. Relations
remained respectable through the 1960's as both countries
displayed a willingness to concentrate on peripheral matters
in the spirit of "peaceful coexistence."
The 19 70's witnessed a period of decline in Japan-Soviet
relations. In 1976, a Soviet pilot (Lt. Viktor Belenko)
defected and landed his MIG-25 in Hakodate, Japan. The
Soviets were outraged when the Japanese allowed US personnel
to analyze the plane before returning it to the USSR. The
continuous arguing over fishing rights and the frequent seizures
of Japanese fishing vessels by the Soviets irritated the
Japanese. Additionally, the Soviet's disapproval of the
Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1978 became
manifest in the buildup of the Soviet Pacific Fleet and the
introduction of troops and military equipment to the Northern
Territories. The Soviet military entry into Afghanistan
in December 19 79 served notice to the world that the Soviets
were not reluctant to use their military power in areas
outside of Eastern Europe. Recent incidents causing further
concern for both parties have been Japan's pledge to pro-
tect the sea lanes within 1000 miles of Japan and the Soviet
deployment of Backfire bombers and SS-20 missiles to the Far
East.
In evaluating the current situation from the Japanese
perspective, the following issues continue to be pertinent:
16

a) The Northern Territories: The Japanese have long
considered the islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and
the Hobomai group (see Figure 1) as an integral part of Japan.
Previously inhabited by Japanese, they were recognized in
past treaties as Japanese territory, and Japan believes they
were wrongfully occupied by Soviet forces immediately follow-
ing World War II. The unresolved issue serves as an unpleasant
reminder of the time when Japan was a defeated country.
Former Prime Minister Eisaku Sato may have accurately ex-
pressed the Japanese desire to resolve this problem when he
stated, "I just want to tie up the loose ends of the war."
b) the US-USSR military balance: Whereas once the US could
be recognized as the predominant military power in the Pacific,
this no longer holds true. Factors contributing to this
shift include the drawdown of US forces following the with-
drawal from Vietnam, the significant increase in Soviet mili-
tary strength in the region, the proposed pullout of US
troops from Korea, and the new policy emphasis on the Nixon
Doctrine calling for US allies to do more for themselves.
The potential ramifications for Japan were suggested by
Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira in April 19 80 when he stated,
"The United States is not a superpower any longer. The days
12
are gone when we were able to rely on America's deterrence."
c) The Soviet military buildup: The marked expansion of
the Soviet military in the East Asia region in recent years
has created increasing anxiety among the Japanese (see












Okinawa Islands ; Ogasawara Islands
The Northern Territories
J
Source: Swearingen, Rodger, The Soviet Union
and Postwar Japan . btanrora, ua.
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d) Soviet diplomatic style: Though the brusque nature of
the Soviets somewhat offends the Japanese, more importantly,
they objeat to the lack of respect afforded them by the
USSR. The Japanese consider the unilateral Soviet release
of a draft treaty on USSR-Japan friendship and cooperation
(February 1978) as a prime example of the disregard the
Soviets show for Japan as a fellow sovereign nation.
e) Fishing rights: Since Japan regained its sovereignty
in the early 19 50*s, jockeying over Japanese fishing rights
in the northern areas (the Sea of Okhotsk, in the vicinity
of the Kuriles, and the Bering Sea) have persisted. Though
interim agreements have been concluded at different times,
hard fought negotiations routinely address fish quotas,
area usage fees, and the seizure of Japanese boats by the
Soviets.
f) The Siberian connection: The Japanese have involved
themselves in a number of projects to cultivate some of the
natural resources of Siberia and provide new inputs to the
Japanese market.
With the above background information in mind, the impact
of the Soviet "threat" on Japan will now be examined.
19

II. CHANGES IN SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES
In attempting to size up the "threat" posed by a nation,
consideration must be given to both the capabilities and
intent of that nation to carry out such a threat. No matter
how much one nation despises another, if the one does not
possess the capability to attack the other, it cannot posture
a viable threat. Conversely, simple because one nation
possesses impressive power projection capabilities, without
the intent to employ these capabilities against another, it
does not pose a threat. The military capabilities of the
Soviet Pacific forces (in particular, the Soviet Navy) have
significantly improved since the end of World War II (especially
since the late 1970's). This military buildup has not been
directed solely at any one country alone, but for Japan, it
presents potential problems which must be considered when
addressing national security.
At the close of World War II, the USSR set a high priority
on establishing "friendly" buffer states along its European
borders as part of its defense strategy against the West.
East Asis never provided as neat a package to deal with for
the Soviets as did Europe. Not only was a vast amount of
ocean involved, but also fewer, and less rigid defense agree-
ments (with the US) had been contracted, and the Soviets
seemed to find it more difficult to gauge the reactions of
20

the nations of the Orient. The Soviet Pacific Fleet emerged
unscathed from World War II (as opposed to the other Soviet
fleets) but still possessed extremely limited capabilities.
Its capabilities centered around coastal defense with empha-
sis on mine warfare. The power projection capabilities of
the other Soviet forces (over water) were also nil.
Soviet forces in general remained oriented towards
close-in defense of the homeland until the Cuban Missile
Crisis of 1962. The new Soviet priority then became the
development of ICBM's. The US Navy reigned supreme in the
Pacific and the Soviets had little with which to offer a
challenge. The Soviet Pacific Fleet of the mid-19 60' s con-
tained only a handful of DDG's/FF's, about a hundred submarines,
and numerous older combatants and minor naval warships
.
About this same time, the US began deploying the Polaris A3
missile aboard its SSBN's. Though the USSR recognized the
threat posed by the US Navy's CV's and SSBN's, only a gradual
response evolved in the Soviet Pacific Fleet. In 1974, the
Soviet Pacific Fleet possessed ten major surface combatants
with credible ASW and/or anti-CV capabilities.
The withdrawal of US forces from Vietnam and the extensive
cutbacks in US deployed forces and ships in the mid-19 70'
s
marked the end of US absolute predominence in the Pacific.
However, this in itself did not spur on rapid Soviet naval
expansion. In fact, at the end of 19 77, Admirals Zumwalt and
Bagley in an article commented that little change had occurred
in the Soviet Pacific Fleet in the last ten years whereas
21

the Soviet Army and Air Force in the Far East reflected much
progress. In contrast, the next two years (19 78-79) must
be considered a watershed period for the Soviet Pacific
Fleet. Whereas the gradual Soviet naval buildup in the
late 1960's/early 1970*s appears to have been primarily a
response to military stimuli (US CV's and SSBN's), the new
(and more significant) response about to occur appears more
as a military response resulting from political developments
in East Asia. The Soviets were quite vocally displeased when
Japan and China signed a Peace and Friendship Treaty in August
19 78 (especially because of its "anti-hegemony" clause) and
were no doubt further aggravated when the US formally recog-
nized China in December 1978. Possibly, with visions of a
US-China-Japan alliance wrapping its arms around the Russian
bear, the Soviets reacted swiftly. Relations markedly im-
proved with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) which
culminated in the USSR-Vietnam Treaty of Peace and Friendship
(November 1978) . Significant Soviet troop buildups began
in the Northern Territories of Japan and air surveillance
missions around Japan were stepped up (see Figures 2 and 3).
.
As part of the response to this new perceived threat, the
capabilities of the Soviet Pacific Fleet received direct
attention. Before the end of 1979, the Minsk (CVHG) , two
Karas CCG) , one Kresta II CCG) , the Ivan Rogov (LPDl , one




Not*: Number of ships and Instances Indicates average figures over the past five years.
Source: Japan Defense Agency. Defense of Japan 1982
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In response to the invasion of Vietnam by the PRC in
February 1979, the Soviets sent a task group to the South
China Sea (apparently as a show of force in support of Viet-
nam) consisting of five surface combatants, an amphibious
vessel, a minesweeper, and other auxiliary vessels (with
probable submarine support also) . As this new Soviet aggres-
siveness in the Pacific emerged, naval improvements continued,
highlighted by weapons/platform sophistication and advances
2in ASW capabilities. By the early 19 80's, no longer did
antiquated ships constitute the bulk of the Soviet Pacific
Fleet.
The following figures give some idea of the growth of the
Soviet Pacific Fleet since 1974:
1974 1979 1982
SSBN "\
7- 10 (40 28 30
Sub (other) J nuclear) 85 95
Major surface 55 78 85
Minor surface 135 180 215
Amphibious (large) 18 18 20
Major Auxiliaries na 80 77
Combat aircraft na 300 330
While there obviously have been quantitative improvements,
the qualitative improvements are more impressive. About 4 0%
of the Soviet SSBN inventory is now in the Pacific Fleet.
Of the "other" 9 5 submarines, about 23 are SSG/SSGN's which
4
represent a formidable threat to enemy surface combatants.
The surface combatants are highlighted by 1 CV, 7 CG's,
25

2 CL's, 1 CC, 11 SAM DDG's, 6 FFG's, 15 DD's, 30 FF's, and
55 missile craft/corvettes. 5
Soviet Naval Air (SNA) in the Pacific region features
the following aircraft:
IL-38 May cl5




Yak-36 Forger c20 (onboard Minsk)
capabilities of the Backfire bomber deser
comment. The Backfire has a combat radius (without refuel-
7ing) of over 30 00 NM and can attain speeds up to 1100 KTs.
Considering that most Pacific Backfires are stationed just
north of Vladivostok, they can be out over the Sea of Japan
or Sea of Okhotsk almost immediately after takeoff, and on a
direct flight could be over Tokyo in less than an hour
(.though with its combat radius, the Backfire is capable of
approaching the main islands of Japan from any direction)
.
Nuclear capable and effective against either surface comba-
tants at sea or against land targets, the Backfire can carry
a large assortment of bombs or air-to-surface missiles.
The Marine Corps of the Soviet military is the Soviet
Naval Infantry (SNI) . Of the estimated 12,000 personnel in
the SNI, the greatest proportion (.about 8,00 0) are stationed
in the Pacific (near Vladivostok) . This large deployment
of SNI to this area suggests their possible use in securing
the northern tip of Hokkaido bordering the Soya Strait which
26

would be a critical passage for the Soviets to maintain in
time of conflict to enable sea communication between Vladi-
vostok and the Sea of Okhotsk/Petropavlovsk.
The tempo and type of operations of the Soviet Pacific
Fleet in recent years give some indications of its growing
importance in Soviet planning. While in 1975 the fleet
averaged about 700 out of area ship days (number of days of
operation outside of territorial waters) , by 1981 these out
o
of area operations had jumped to 11,5 00 days. Part of these
out of area operations involves the fleet's support for the
Soviet Indian Ocean forces. Ten surface combatants and one
submarine are routinely deployed from the Soviet Pacific
Fleet to support this mission.
Though Soviet air surveillance missions had routinely
conducted reconnaissance over the Sea of Japan, beginning
in July 1976 the Soviets initiated flights off the eastern
coast of Japan for the first time. As can be seen in Figure
2 these flights in the east have expanded in both number and
scope and now exceed 40 per year.
The Ivan Rogov did not become a permanent member of the
Soviet Pacific Fleet but the Minsk appears more likely to
stay based on the delivery of an 80,00 ton floating drydock
to Vladivostok from Japan in 19 78.
Regarding specifically Japan, the Soviets demonstrated
considerable foresight when they insisted on the return of
Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands at the end of World War II.
27

Their subsequent occupation of the four islands recognized
by most as Japan's Northern Territories (Habomai, Shikotan,
Kunashiri, and Etorofu) provided a natural defensive barrier
between the Sea of Okhotsk and the Pacific Ocean. Though
this aspect of the regional geography offers some degree of
protection, other geographical factors have been less kind.
With the exception of Petropavlovsk and Magadon, ships de-
parting Soviet ports normally need to transit through the
Tsushima, Tsugaru, or Soya Straits (see Figure 2) to gain
access to the open ocean. The Tsushima Strait, while the
widest of the three, is flanked and observed closely by
Japan and South Korea. The Tsugaru Strait (between Honshu
and Hokkaido) is completely within Japanese waters. Unin-
terrupted access to the Soya Strait (between Sakhalin and
Hokkaido) is considered the "number one priority" for the
Soviets in the opinion of VADM M. Staser Holcomb (COMSEVENTHFLT)
.
The strait is 24 miles wide and represents an important Soviet
sea communications link. Since Petropavlovsk (home of most
Pacific Fleet submarines) has no logistics support available
via overland means, it depends primarily on logistics by
sea. The majority of this support comes from the Vladivostok
area through the Soya Strait. Since Japan borders the Soya
Strait to the south, some believe that in a time of conflict
the Soviets may quickly move to gain control of this northern
tip of Hokkaido (as discussed earlier!
.
In the second half of the 1970' s as Japan-China relations
continued to improve, the Soviets expressed their displeasure
28

through normal diplomatic channels and through military
actions. In May 1978 , the Soviets began increasing their
troop strength in Japan's Northern Territories. This marked
the first influx of Soviet troops into this area since 1960.
From the end of World War II until I9 60, a division of Soviet
troops occupied the Northern Territories. Subsequently,
the forces were reduced to 2,000 border guards until the new
arrival of troops in May 1978. 10 In July 1978, Soviet naval
units conducted amphibious and gunnery exercises in the
vicinity of Etorofu. This flexing of Soviet muscles did
not deter the Japanese from their diplomatic endeavors and
in August 19 78 a Peace and Friendship Treaty was signed
between Japan and China. The "anti-hegemony" clause con-
tained in this treaty was considered as a direct affront by
the Soviets . The Soviet military buildup in the Northern
Territories continued and Soviet leaders made it quite clear
that they were not approachable on the subject of eventual
return of the Northern Territories to Japan. Today approxi-
mately 10,000 troops are deployed in the Northern Territories
Their support equipment not only includes such standard
items as mixed artillery, tanks, APC's, and surface-to-air
missiles, but also 130mm cannons and helicopter gunships
(the MI-24 Hind}. 11 Additionally, ten MIG-21 fighter air-
craft were deployed to the Northern Territories in late 1982
and by January 19 83, twenty MIG-23's were discovered in the
12
area. Some of the air bases have also been used in
29

conjunction with Tu-95 Bear operations. Soviet radar defense
sites have also been installed on the islands and there
have been reports of Soviet warships using Hittokappa Bay
on Etorofu as an anchorage (the same staging area used by
the Imperial Japanese Navy in preparation for the attack on
Pearl Harbor)
.
In late August 19 83, building materials were
transported to Suisho Island (one of the Habomai group) by
the Soviets. It remains unknown whether these materials
are being used on the island's lighthouse or for new construc-
tion. The island is currently guarded by members of the
Soviet Border Patrol. Additionally, the Soviets are up-
grading the military facilities on Shimushir Island, one of
the Kurile Islands about halfway between Hokkaido and the
14Kamchatka Peninsula.
As Japan-China relations improved and as Japan appeared
to be warming to US proposals to accept greater regional de-
fense responsibilities, the Soviets continued to exert pres-
sure on Japan to discourage these moves. Air reconnaissance
missions around Japan were further intensified which in-
cluded occasional airspace violations of Japanese territory
(about two incidents per year) . Warship activity likewise
increased. Soviet ship passages through the straits around
Japan increased from an average of 30 in 19 77 to 360 by
19 82. On 22 April 1981 a Krivak DDG expended 18 rounds of
100mm gunfire while conducting target practice on a buoy
about 30 miles northwest of Kyoroku Island (with numerous
30

Japanese fishing boats in the area) . The Soviets also ob-
struct Japanese fishing operations by declaring extensive
sea areas off limits in order to conduct at-sea missile
tests.
Besides those aircraft assigned to Soviet Naval Air
previously mentioned, another estimated 200 bombers and 1550
tactical fighters serve in the Soviet Far East Air Force.
Of these 200 bombers, about 40 are Backfires (for a total
of about 70 Backfires among the Soviet military forces in
the Far East)
.
The tactical fighters have quadrupled in
number since 1966. Not only have the number of aircraft
significantly increased, but older aircraft have been re-
placed by some of the USSR's most modern planes.
Possibly the most politically and militarily influential
additions to the Soviet Far East forces have been the SS-20
Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) missiles which the
Soviets began deploying to Siberia (near Lake Baikal), in
1977 and now number over 100. Contained in mobile missile
launchers, these missiles each carry three nuclear MIRV
warheads. With a range of about 3000 NM, both China and
Japan lay within easy striking range of these missiles.
A. CHINA AND THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
The potential impact of the Soviet military buildup on
Japan cannot be fully appreciated by focusing only on the
areas proximate to Japan. Japan's dependence on uninterrupted
sea lines of commerce extends its Achille's Heel far from its
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immediate body. In addition, Soviet actions in the Pacific
result not only from concerns about Japan, but also (and
often more so) from concerns about China and the US.
The year 19 78 witnessed important improvements in China's
relations with Japan and the US. To counter this perceived
encirclement plan, the Soviets initiated diplomatic and
military moves to outflank China. The Soviets signed a
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Vietnam in November
This Soviet support paved the way for Vietnam's invasion of
Kampuchea in December. China's "punitive" incursion into
Vietnam in February 19 79 not only failed to demonstrate
it military might over the Vietnamese, it opened the door
for the Soviet Navy in the South China Sea. The Soviets
responded to the Chinese invasion by detaching a task group
of ships to the South China Sea as a sign of support for
Vietnam. The Chinese Navy made no response to this Soviet
task group (.though statistics would suggest that the Chinese
Navy ranks third in the world, it is primarily coastal de-
fense oriented and has minimal force projection capabilities!
The real winner of China's "punitive" action was the USSR.
By March 19 79 the first Soviet naval units were sighted in
Cam Ranh Bay, by April two TU-9 5 Bears were using the air
facility at Da Nang, and a Foxtrot submarine soon appeared
in Cam Ranh Bay. In less than a year the Soviets broke out
of their perceived position of potentially being bottled up
in the Pacific to a position of impressive power projection
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capabilities which strategically threatened the other major
players in the Pacific.
Cam Ranh Bay offered the Soviets a warm water port with
direct access to the open sea in a strategically critical
location. Its location and facilities offer excellent
logistics/repair support for units transiting to and from
the Indian Ocean. Its proximity to the Malacca Strait and
its eastern approaches offers an excellent location from
which to conduct continual air, surface, and sub-surface
surveillance activities in the South China Sea plus an
immediate capacity to interdict critical sea lanes of economic
(especially crucial to Japan) and military importance. This
new forward deployed posture enables the Soviets to respond
more rapidly to many Third World events that might arise.
Additionally, the relatively short distance between Vietnam
and the Philippines (720 NM) offers the opportunity to con-
duct preemptive air strikes against Subic Naval Base or
Clark Air Base, or conduct mining operations against Subic
Bay.
The USSR currently keeps about 10 ships at Cam Ranh Bay
including a cruise missile submarine, one major combatant,
two minor combatants, an AGI, oiler, repair ship, replenish-
17
ment (stores) ship, and buoy tender. There have also been
indications of ongoing construction of support facilities
18
for nuclear submarines. In recent years SSG/SSGN units
have patrolled the South China Sea in areas where they could
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threaten Japanese merchants or US Naval forces transiting to
and from the Indian Ocean. Four Tu-9 5 Bears are deployed
to Cam Ranh Bay and conduct routine surveillance flights
over the South China Sea. Their flight patterns extend
north to the Bashi Channel (between Taiwan and the Philippines)




B. OBJECTIVES OF SOVIET PACIFIC FORCES
Pertinent objectives of Soviet military forces in the
Pacific include:
1) Preservation of the Sea of Okhotsk as an SSBN bastion.
This stands out as one of the most important objectives of
the Soviet military
—
protection of the strategic strike
forces. To support this goal it appears the Soviet military
expansion program in the Kurile Islands and Northern Terri-
tories is an attempt to construct "a barrier impenetrable
20by hostile forces."
2) Prevention of Japan from becoming part of a power
alignment with the US or China. Historical relations between
the USSR and Japan reflect a definite lack of trust on both
sides. At the close of World War II the Soviets lobbied to
gain influence over the administration of Japan, probably
with the intention of trying to mold it into another buffer
state as in Eastern Europe. They strongly opposed the US
domination of the Allied Occupation in Japan and felt threat-
ened by the US-Japan security arrangements which eventually
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evolved, and the stationing of US forces in Japan. The
USSR has at times appealed to the strong sentiment of paci-
fism in postwar Japan, and at other times has taken political
and military steps in an attempt to move Japan towards a
position of neutralism of "Finlandization. " With Japan
now leaning towards a stronger supportive role for US objec-
tives in the Pacific, Soviet diplomatic and military maneuvers
have been targeted at creating a sense of isolation for the
Japanese.
3) Containment of Chinese power in East Asia. The USSR
wants to avoid the possibility of a two front war with Western
Europe and China as it would heavily strain their military
resources. To insure that China did not become overconfi-
dent about its regional prowess after strengthening relations
with Japan and the US, the USSR allied with Vietnam,
strengthened its Pacific Fleet, and set up shop in the South
China Sea to form its own encirclement of China.
4) Deny the US supremacy of the seas and deter "destabi-
lizing" actions by Western/Eastern powers.
5) Maintain a capability to interdict enemy sea lines of
communications and protect Soviet SLOC's. With its access
to Cam Ranh Bay, the Soviet Navy enjoys a favorable position
to not only interdict shipping transiting the Malacca Strait
but also to help keep these areas open for Soviet shipping.
It should be remembered that the Soviet Far East has ex-




The sea lanes through Malacca are important to the Soviets
as well as many other nations. Therefore, Soviet inter-
diction tactics may prefer selective interdiction (e.g.,
by submarines) vice completely denied passage as would
result from mining. Additionally, unrestricted passage
through the straits around Japan (especially Soya) will be
important in times of crisis/conflict.
6) Promote Soviet interests throughout the Pacific.
The radius of this capability was markedly extended by the
addition of Vietnam support facilities.
Changes in Soviet military forces in the Pacific reflect
changing attitudes of the Soviet government towards the
Pacific region. Though formerly given minimal thought, the
region has assumed a new perspective for the Soviets. Though
much of the Sino-Soviet border is rugged and barren, the
Soviets cannot ignore the threat potential of their Chinese
neighbor. The USSR stations 52 divisions of troops in the
Far East (approximately 470,000 personnel), most along the
Sino-Soviet border. The Soviets continue to assure the
Japanese that the SS-20 missiles located in Siberia are
directed against China.
The Northeast Asia region carries new significance for
the USSR. In a world of dwindling natural resources, Siberia
has just begun to be recognized for its vast natural wealth
which has barely been touched thus far. To reduce the
vulnerability of its SSBN's, the Soviets have turned the
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Sea of Okhotsk into a protective haven, from where SLBM's
can be launched without the submarines venturing out into
the Pacific where they face likely detection (by US forces)
while enroute to their patrol stations. As the strategic
value of Northeast Asia has increased for the USSR, it pro-
vides little comfort for the Soviets to see the region pre-
dominantly aligned with the US (ROK and Japan)
.
Though the Soviets likely viewed US failures in Vietnam
with satisfaction, disappointment probably remains over
ASEAN' s tilt towards the US. Since the USSR achieved little
success in its diplomatic dealings with Pacific nations, it
turned to military pressure to influence political outcomes.
Although Soviet Pacific forces (especially the Soviet
Navy) have made impressive strides since the late 19 70's,
shortcomings still exist. In Northeast Asia, choke points
and ice continue to hinder unrestricted operations. The
amphibious capabilities of the Soviet Navy remain limited.
Little capability exists to provide air cover for surface
and submarine units at extended ranges from land with only
one aircraft carrier in the Pacific inventory. Additionally,
the problem of lack of forward bases and long range logis-
tics support should not be considered resolved by the facili-
ties currently enjoyed by the USSR in Vietnam. Though
Vietnam leans heavily on the Soviets for economic/military
assistance ($3-4 million per day) , it retains a strong
independent will and has previously demonstrated the
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capacity to shift alignments when considered in its best
interests.
In summary, with respect to Japan, the USSR possesses
the capability to interdict vital SLOC's, conduct INF or
aircraft strikes against Japan, carry out air, surface, and
subsurface operations against JMSDF ships in the vicinity
of Japan, and to mount an amphibious assault on Hokkaido.
While the USSR has been able to use alignments with other
countries (i.e., India and Vietnam) to assist in "encircling"
China, it has not readily enjoyed this same opportunity with
21
regard to Japan. As a result, the Soviets have resorted
to direct action and employed their own forces to pressure
and attempt to isolate Japan. These actions have taken the
form of an expanded Soviet Pacific Fleet with increased
operations near Japan, large Soviet troop and equipment
movements into the Northern Territories, and frequent sur-
veillance flights around Japan. The impact of this growing




Ill- ATTITUDES OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT
Any government is composed of a multitude of departments
and divisions. To sample most of these divisions would
present problems of collecting sufficient data to support
any meaningful results. Consequently, for the purposes of
this paper, the offices of the Prime Minister, Foreign
Minister, Japan Defense Agency and the positions of the
opposition parties will be examined with regards to pertinent
views which have developed with respect to security matters
and the Soviet threat in the postwar period.
A. PRIME MINISTERS: PRIORITIES AND THE USSR
In the early 1950's, Prime Minister Yoshida laid the
groundwork for what became known as the "Yoshida strategy."
The basic components of this strategy were: 1) economic
recovery, 2) rejection of rearming, 3) economic and diplo-
matic alignment with the US and United Kingdom, and 4) dependence
on the US for security. Of these, economic recovery stood
out as the leading priority in Yoshida ' s mind. The Yoshida
strategy set Japan's course for most of the next two decades.
The USSR was regarded by the Japanese government as a
less than friendly neighbor, but certainly not a threat.
When Prime Minister Hatoyama came into office in 19 54, he
devoted himself to improving Japan-Soviet relations and
succeeded in normalizing relations by late 1956. Though some
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difficult issues remained unresolved (such as the Northern
Territories)
,
Japan opted to deal with the Soviets on peri-
pheral issues to maintain a positive relationship. As Japan
strived to reestablish itself internally and externally, and
mend its war wounds, it sought to avoid external complica-
tions in order to maximize economic progress . Constructive
relations with members of the international community became
a necessity and the sticky issues could be temporarily side-
stepped. This basic outlook held true throughout the 19 60's
and into the 19 70's.
Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka' s administration exempli-
fied this diplomatic approach in the early 19 70's as it
sought more mature relations with the Communist countries.
Tanaka finalized the normalization of relations between Japan
and China in 19 72. Sensing that Japan had attained a stable
base of economic prosperity and that the time had arrived
to resolve more difficult problems, he personally travelled
to Moscow in October 19 73 (the first time since 1956 that a
Japanese prime minister had visited the USSR) with the intent
of specifically addressing the Northern Territories issue
and seeking progress towards concluding a peace treaty. At
the conclusion of the talks, it was reported that some prob-
lems remained "outstanding." When queried on whether the
Northern Territories was one of these "outstanding" issues,
Prime Minister Tanaka replied, "there are no such things as
outstanding problems which do not include the territorial
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2problem. " Though the Soviets expressed interest in pro-
moting closer relations (on their terms) , the stage was set
for a gradual cooling of official Japanese relations with
the USSR.
As the US began cutting back its Pacific military forces
in the mid-1970's, visions of a "power vacuum" began to take
shape in the minds of some Pacific countries which had
security ties with the US. Japan's interest in national
security matters increased but the USSR was still not re-
garded as posing a threat. Concerns over the USSR were
dampened by blossoming Japanese ties with China and the widen-
ing Sino-Soviet split. Japan felt it could pursue an "omni-
directional" diplomacy of maintaining positive relations with
all countries.
The USSR did not share Japan's optimism about "omni-
directional" relations and sought to preclude the conclusion
of a friendship treaty between Japan and China. In early
February 1978, Brezhnev sent a letter to Prime Minister
Fukuda encouraging a friendship treaty between Japan and the
USSR. Though Japan showed no interest in the suggestion,
the Soviets unilaterally published a proposal for a Soviet-
Japan "Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Cooperation" in
Izvestia on February 23, 19 78. If insult to the Japanese
government was intended, then success was achieved. Aside
from the significant fact that the Japanese had not participated
in drafting the proposal, Japan objected to the following
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items in the treaty draft: the Northern Territories were
not addressed, the treaty would negate Japan-US security
arrangements, the treaty was open-ended (i.e., no termination
date)
,
and the security clause used in the treaty resembled
those used by the Soviets with their "client" states rather
than showing proper respect for Japan as an independent
sovereign nation.
The Soviets * continued warnings to Japan over the impend-
ing Sino-Japan Friendship Treaty only served to harden the
resolve of Prime Minister Fukuda. He continued to stress
that the "hegemonic" clause being discussed for the treaty
was not aimed at any third nation, but he also indicated
that he had "no intention of taking a policy of making con-
4
cessions to the Soviet Union."
Failing to dissuade Japan from signing a friendship
treaty with China, the Soviets turned to their military
to bring new pressures on the Japanese. Soviet troops com-
menced moving into the Northern Territories beginning in
May 19 78. As the numbers of Soviet combat troops and equip-
ment arriving on the islands continued to rise, the Japanese
government seemed somewhat baffled by this latest Soviet
tactic. Few options were available to counter the Soviet
actions except words, and even these had few barbs. In
February 19 79, the Diet called for a resolution to the problem





The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (December 19 79)
sounded the bell more clearly in Japan that the Soviets would
take direct military action against an Asian country when
deemed in their interests. Prime Minister Ohira was quite
upset over the Afghanistan situation. Not only had the
USSR demonstrated a willingness to militarily intervene out-
side of its Eastern European sphere, but it now posed a
direct threat to Japan's economic lifelines in the Middle
East with no substantial regional power to deter them (since
the Iranian government had recently been overthrown) . The
Prime Minister felt that some sort of punitive response was
in order but at the same time, he did not want to eliminate
the foundation of constructive relations with the Soviets.
This attitude was apparent in the compromise embargo effected
in February 19 80.
Finding a label for the USSR that was accurate, yet not
offensive, apparently created an internal struggle for Prime
Minister Ohira. On January 22, 19 80, he commented that the
USSR was "defensive" in nature. Only one week later, he
modified his previous comments by stating that the Soviet
troops in the Northern Territories (which now were at divi-
sion strength) did pose a "potential threat to Japan." No
prime minister in the postwar period had previously referred
to the USSR as a threat.
Just as Prime Minister Ohira was converted from thinking
of the Soviets as purely "defensive, " a similar process took
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place with his successor, Zenko Suzuki. Speaking before the
Diet on January 30, 19 81, Suzuki commented that the USSR
did not represent an immediate danger to Japan. 7 Shortly
thereafter, in an appeal to raise nationalistic feelings,
he marked February 7th as the first Northern Territories
Day, in remembrance of the day Japan acquired those islands
from Russia in 1855 (Treaty of Shimoda) . By May, Prime
Minister Suzuki was pledging to the US that Japan would build
up the SDF to enable defense of the sea lanes within 1000
miles of Japan. Then at the Ottawa Summit in July, he
emphasized that world peace was threatened by the expansion
of Soviet military forces.
While it remains cloudy whether Prime Minister Suzuki
became whole-heartedly converted in his views of the Soviets,
or whether he simply tended to bend with the wind, there has
been little doubt about the stance of the current prime
minister, Yasuhiro Nakasone. In office less than two months,
he rattled the Soviets' cages (and many in Japan) with some
of his comments while in the US in January 19 83. His re-
marks on the "common destinies" of Japan and the US plus his
analogy of Japan as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" spun
many heads in the international arena. Actually, the "un-
sinkable aircraft carrier" quote is not quite accurate.
When he made this comment to senior Washington Post per-
sonnel at a breakfast on January 18, his interpreter trans-
lated his comment into English as "unsinkable aircraft carrier."
However, it more correctly should have been translated as
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"large aircraft carrier" since the words used by the Prime
Minister were "okina koku bokan " vice fuchin kubo . Aside
from the emotional impact of the translation, the thrust of
the comment was that the Japanese "carrier" would help to
protect Japan from Soviet Backfire bombers. He further com-
mented that Japan should work towards the capability of
restricting Soviet usage of the straits around Japan in times
of crisis and that Japan should strengthen its air defenses
Qin order to effectively counter Soviet strike forces.
Not surprisingly, the USSR reacted sharply to the Japanese
leader's comments. Tass wrote that "Such a planner will
cause Japan to become a target of a retaliatory strike. . .this
will lead Japan, which is a densely populated country, to
far more serious nationwide devastation than that 37 years
9
ago." Soviet Foreign Trade Minister Nikolai Patolichev
informed a visiting Japanese business delegation in February
that Japan's "carrier" would not last more than 20 minutes
if the USSR decided to take military action against Japan.
Thus far, Prime Minister Nakasone seems undaunted by
the rhetoric emanating from Moscow. In his dealings with the
Soviets as well as other nations, one of his foremost goals
has been to gain respect for Japan as a major player in the
international arena. Nakasone instructed Ambassador Takashima
(Japanese ambassador to the USSR) in April 19 83 to inform
Soviet officials that a Gromyko visit to Japan was expected
as the next move to improve relations since Soviet Foreign
Ministers had come to Japan only three times, whereas Japanese
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Foreign Ministers had travelled to the USSR six times. As
the Prime Minister put it, "This concerns Japan's prestige." 11
Nakasone has signaled both his own people and other nations
that Japan is moving to clearly demonstrate its status as a
member of the West and will assume a political posture com-
mensurate with its economic influence. He emphasized these
points during his trips to the ROK, the ASEAN nations,
Washington, and at the Williamsburg Summit. At Williams-
burg, he took the lead in addressing security issues and
claimed to the leaders in attendance that "the security of
our countries is indivisible." He stressed that a united
front amongst the Western nations was necessary to increase
the Soviet's willingness to negotiate. His strong position
on the unacceptability of the Soviets transferring SS-20's
from Europe to Siberia was evident when he stated that,
"We Japanese don't want the Soviet Union to use Asia as a
13
garbage dump for any SS-20's it may withdraw from Europe."
Although Prime Minister Nakasone has not shied away from
confronting the USSR on various issues, he would welcome
improved relations if the Soviets demonstrated a sincere
interest to effect changes. He stated in March 19 83, "the
basis for improvement of relations with the Soviet Union
is the settlement of the territorial problem. . .My intention
is to endeavor for a breakthrough, perseveringly, with some
14degree of flexibility."
The Nakasone government has been firm but has avoided
overreacting to Soviet-related incidents, as evidenced by
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such Soviet intelligence activities as the Levchenko affair,
the Vinogradov case, and "spy boat" operations. The Levchenko
affair involves Stanislov Levchenko, a supposed Soviet reporter
for the Novoye Vremya ( New Times ) , who was initially assigned
to Tokyo in 19 75. On October 24, 19 79, he requested politi-
cal asylum from US officials in Tokyo, identifying himself
as a KGB agent, and was immediately flown to the US. In
Levchenko' s subsequent testimony concerning his activities
in Japan (which was released in segments beginning in late
19 82)
,
Levchenko claimed to have recruited the services of
up to 200 Japanese, including Diet members (mostly JSP)
,
one former Cabinet minister, newspaper officials, journalists,
academicians, and at least one SDF officer.
When bits of Levchenko 's testimony were released in
December 19 82, Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary Gotoda remarked
to an Upper House Committee, "We have to take it seriously,
but I think most people discount the allegations as untrue."
Whereas some countries would eagerly pursue prosecution of
individuals named as possible Soviet collaborators, the
Japanese government has been hesitant to do so. It seems to
prefer not to create significant controversy over the matter.
Many Japanese recommend that since Levchenko caused little
harm to Japan, the issue should be dropped. At the bottom
of it all, one senses that the Japanese have little regard
for the testimony of a foreigner against their own people.
Another Soviet intelligence gathering case, reported in
June 19 83, involved Soviet embassy First Secretary Vinogradov.
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He had attempted to persuade a high-technology company
official who was about to retire, to set up a dummy organi-
zation to pass on technical information to the Soviets in
return for monetary rewards. The Japanese government dis-
covered the plan and deported Vinogradov. This incident
again aroused little anti-Soviet sentiment.
The USSR also appears to be taking advantage of its
position in the Northern Territories with respect to Japanese
fishermen. Estimates indicate that up to 65 "spy boats"
(actually Japanese fishing boats) may be providing Japanese
technology in the form of electronics and integrated circuits,
in return for fishing privileges around the Northern Terri-
tories (reportedly rich in crab and scallops) . Since the
Soviets control these areas, it is difficult for Japanese
18
officials to counter this activity.
Despite these Soviet intelligence activities in and
around Japan, Prime Minister Nakasone confirmed that he
had no intention of enacting a Spy Prevention Law (.lingering
domestic concern over government secrets outweighs concern
for information passed on to the Soviets!
.
When KAL Flight 00 7 was shot down by the Soviets on
September 1, 19 83, Nakasone' s response hinted at but did not
concentrate on the Soviet "threat." Though 28 of his country-
men lost their lives in the incident, the actions of the
Prime Minister showed an interest in not erecting new obsta-
cles to further impede Soviet-Japan relations. While
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labelling the incident a "barbarous act," at the same time he
warned that "we must not make this incident a new source of
East-West confrontation." He declared that unilateral action
would not be taken but rather a concensus response would
be worked out with Seoul and Washington. The KAL incident
did however, give the Prime Minister an opportunity to edge
public concerns toward his security outlook. In his remarks
on the tragedy, he commented, "I think (the people) have come
to understand, through this incident, in what a severe sit-
in
uation the international situation is placed." Nakasone
respects the threatening capabilities of the Soviets, but he
refuses to shrink in the face of them. He recognizes that
Japan cannot (yet) stand alone against the USSR but that
bargaining leverage can be gained when acting in concert with
other Western nations.
B. PRIME MINISTERS: ATTITUDES ON DEFENSE MEASURES
Concern over the perceived Soviet "threat" could be
reflected in part by Japanese leaders' approaches to various
defense issues such as the development of the SDF, security
ties with the US, budget allocations for defense, degree of
support for Japan's restrictive constitution, and nuclear
weapons policies. Consistencies and inconsistencies among
Japan's prime ministers on these matters will be examined.
As mentioned earlier, part of Prime Minister Yoshida's
strategy was rejection of rearmament. Since he opposed the
idea of reestablishing large military forces, Yoshida
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proposed that the US could continue to post troops within the
country (after Japan regained its independence) in return
for a formal US commitment to defend Japan. Though the US
initially balked at the idea, the Cold War and anti-Communist
atmosphere of the times eventually swung the US to accept
20the offer. Japan's approach to the problem was not particu-
larly anti-Soviet. Japan was an unprotected and decimated
country. Some sort of protective shell needed to be estab-
lished to enable Japan to rebuild itself economically. The
19 51 Japan-US Security Treaty became the cornerstone of
Japan's defense. When the Self-Defense Forces were formally
created in 19 54, they were regarded as a minimal force to
deal with disaster relief, internal security, and limited
defense operations. The development of the SDF has been
restricted since its birth. It has continually been con-
strained by the Constitution. It has been limited by the
responsibilities shouldered by the US through the Japan-US
Security Treaty. For the most part, the prime ministers of
Japan have been satisfied to keep the SDF within these con-
straints. When the Kishi Cabinet set forth the Basic Policy
for National Defense in 19 57, it was explicitly acknowledged
that the growth of the SDF would depend on availability of
resources and domestic support. The defense of the nation
remained dependent on the security treaty with the US. Kishi'
s
belief in the necessity of strong security ties with the US
were such that he sacrificed his office in order to push
through a new security treaty with the US (.the MST) in 19 60.
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With its security blanket renewed, Japan dedicated itself
to internal affairs and economic development. In the early
1970's, Japan underwent a period of "de-Americanization"
during which a new spirit of nationalism and self-confidence
began to emerge. Factors which contributed to this outlook
included: 1) the phenomenal economic progress of Japan,
2) the unpopularity of the Vietnam War, and 3) the Nixon
"shocks" (the President's visit to China and the floating
21
of the dollar)
. This developing sense of assuredness was
brusquely sobered by the 19 73 oil crisis. By 1975, a "re-
Americanization" process had been effected resulting from
Japan's recognition of its acute economic vulnerability, a
renewed awareness of the value of the MST, improved relations
with China, and a realization that North Vietnam's intentions
22
were less humane than some had previously believed.
In 19 76, greater definition was given to the SDF by
means of the National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) adopted
by the Miki government. This document established a "standard
defense force concept" which included quantitative and quali-
tative goals for the SDF. The capabilities of the SDF were
to be limited to an ability to counter a "limited and small
scale aggression" and the mission of the SDF came to be re-
ferred to as "exclusively self-defensive. " Though the NDPO
purports flexibility by its statement that it is based on
the international environment that existed in 19 76, no prime
minister to date has suggested that the NDPO goals for the
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SDF be expanded in spite of the significant increase in
Soviet military capabilities around Japan during this same
period.
Prime Minister Nakasone has not called for a quantita-
tive expansion of the SDF thought he has suggested a broader
purpose than just an "exclusively self-defensive" force.
He is attempting to shift the mission of deterrence from
exclusively a US function to that of the SDF. As he stated
in January 19 83:
. . .the Soviet Union has been constantly expanding
its armaments, and the Soviet Union has spread its
power globally. On that point, the Free World has
been lagging behind, and it is trying to catch up.
We are all making efforts, with the belief that we must
create deterrent power , in order to avoid war and to
maintain peace. ZJ (my emphasis)
Nakasone made similar comments at the Williamsburg
Summit on the importance of deterrent capabilities. He
has also suggested new roles for the SDF which have caused
the Japanese to expand their thinking on defense issues.
When questioned before the Diet in February 19 83, Nakasone
made some rather pointed remarks that Japan might assist
the US in blockading the straits around Japan to help con-
tain the Soviets. He noted that certainly Japan cannot face
Soviet military forces alone, but together with the US,
Japan could act as a "shield" and the US as a "lance" in
24their military strategies. One month later, again before
the Diet, Nakasone remarked that if Japan was in danger of
having its supply lines cut, the SDF might be used to help





The Prime Minister has supported the concept
of accepting responsibility for defending Japan's sea lanes
within 1000 miles of Japan, though the specifics of this
mission have not yet been fully defined.
Though Prime Minister Nakasone suggests new roles for
the SDF, he summed up his position on the SDF when he stated,
"I'm not advocating rearmament. What I'm advocating is
modernization and improvement of the existing SDF. Japan
must be able to defend its territorial airspace and it must
be able to protect itself against attacks and secure its
sea lanes to some extent. We must upgrade the quality of
2 6our forces to achieve these objectives." Even after the
KAL 00 7 incident, though Nakasone expressed his opinion that
the Soviet action symbolized the threat in the Northeast
Asia region, he reminded his listeners that Japan's defense
27buildup would remain "gradual."
Turning to prime ministers' attitudes towards the defense
budget, there has been a fairly consistent pattern of keeping
defense spending at a minimal level. When the Miki Cabinet
adopted the 1% (of GNP) ceiling for defense spending in 1976,
it recognized that the policy was to be just "for the time
28being." Yet it has been staunchly supported by each suc-
cessive prime minister. Even after the Soviet buildup in the
Northern Territories and the invasion of Afghanistan, though
73% of the lower house Diet members viewed the Soviet mili-
tary as a "threat," concern was not great enough to raise
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defense spending over 1% of GNP. 29 in July 19 80, a national
security advisory group for Prime Minister Ohira released
its "Report on Comprehensive National Security" which recom-
mended a 20% increase in yearly defense spending to attain
the NDPO goals. Though this would have raised defense
expenditures to only 1.0 7% of GNP, the recommendation was
, 30 Lrejected. The prime minister seems to have little power
to change those things which have won general acceptance
.
As Prime Minister, Nakasone has assured his people that the
1% ceiling will be respected even though a less constrained
Nakasone in 19 78 advocated increasing security expenditures
to 3% of GNP (including energy related measures)
.
Just as the 1% defense ceiling has stood up well over
the years, so have other defense constraints such as the
Constitution and nuclear weapons policies, in spite of a
dynamic international environment. Unlike most of his
predecessors, Nakasone favors amending the Constitution.
While LDP Executive Board Chairman in 19 78, he proposed
revising the Constitution "in a brave manner" and emphasized
that "the right of belligerency should be recognized to the
SDF." Though as prime minister, he no longer openly advo-
cates revision, he reminds the Japanese that they should have
no reservations about changing the Constitution if deemed
desirable. Nakasone' s interest in revising the Constitution
appears to stem little from concern over the Soviet "threat,"
but rather from a desire to have a governing document which
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truly expresses the will of the Japanese people rather than
the foreign government which initially drafted the document.
The Three Non-Nuclear Principles remain firmly supported
by the Prime Minister's office. Though as head of the JDA in
the early 1970's, Nakasone took the position that tactical,
defensive nuclear weapons would not be unconstitutional, he
has not proposed any changes in nuclear weapons policies
since becoming Prime Minister. Some may be baffled (in-
cluding some Japanese) by the tactics of Prime Minister
Nakasone on security matters. In short, he is a masterful
gamesman. Though a man of determination, he realizes he is
also a servant of the people. He prods his countrymen to
consider unpleasant issues such as security alliances, blockad-
ing of straits, and the shortcomings of the Constitution.
Yet he continually assures the public that the status quo will
be maintained and if changes are to be made, they will
be gradual. Similar to his issuance of the first Defense
White Paper in 19 70 (while Director-General of the JDA) , he
continues to throw the issues before the people in order to
increase public awareness and chisel away at the "insular"
mentality of much of his population. He seeks a change in
the mood of the people but he knows he cannot change it
directly. He seems to hope that by increasing the public's
awareness of the consequences of various potential situations,
that the people will eventually recognize the need for change
and seek modified policies from the government. Though a
gambler, he is not a reckless gambler. He fully realizes
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the fragility of his position and well knows that if he
loses the confidence of his party, he can lose his job
virtually overnight.
C. THE FOREIGN MINISTRY
As would be expected, the views of the office of the
Foreign Minister towards the Soviet Union have tended to
be relatively optimistic and espouse the importance of diplo-
macy as the key to successful relations. In 19 69, the Foreign
Ministry viewed Japan as "safe under an adequate security
32
arrangement," a view that was generally shared throughout
Japan. The Foreign Policy White Papers of Japan throughout
the first half of the 19 70's read almost identically with
respect to the Soviet Union; the positive aspect of economic
relations was noted and the importance of "good neighborly
relations" for the stability of Asia was stressed. Even in
early 19 78, Foreign Minister Sonoda remained optimistic
about Japan-USSR relations. After meeting with Soviet Foreign
Minister Gromyko in Moscow in January 19 78, Sonoda returned
to Japan predicting that the Northern Territories problem
33
would be settled within 5 years. As negotiations for the
Japan-China Friendship Treaty continued, he maintained a
belief that Japan could diplomatically walk the tightrope
and maintain good relations with both the USSR and China as
part of its "omni-directional" policy. By the time the
treaty was signed between Japan and China, the Soviets' adamant
opposition to the process had dimmed Sonoda 's optimism. He
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realized that the treaty represented an alignment of Japan
with US international policy.
By 19 79, some new terms could be seen in Japan's Foreign
Policy White Papers which have continued to reappear in
subsequent official papers and statements. It is still
clear that Japan seeks friendly relations with the USSR,
but it now specifically points out that relations should be
mutually beneficial and founded on trust and understanding .
The timing of these comments reflects Japan's disapproval of
Soviet actions against the 197 8 Sino-Japanese treaty and
also the expansion of Soviet military forces in the Northern
Territories. The approach of the Foreign Minister's office
on security matters remained cautious as can be seen from
Foreign Minister Sonoda ' s comment in February 1979 that "it
will not be wise to fan anti-Soviet sentiments and the
35Japanese-Soviet confrontation unnecessarily" (my emphasis)
.
Though no mention of a "threat" is made, it seems noteworthy
that Japan-USSR security relations had been raised to the
level of "confrontation."
The Foreign Minister has preferred to downplay the mili-
tary aspects of Japan-Soviet relations. In its 1981 White
Paper, it emphasized that Japan was committed to not becoming
a military power, that stable relations with the Soviets was
"indispensable" for the security of Japan, that Soviet action
in the Northern Territories "ran counter to the spirit of
friendship between the two countries" but that Japan's pri-
mary response would remain peaceful negotiations, and that
57

Japan's policies toward the USSR would center on maintaining
a "firm, coherent stance and a cool, patient attitude." 36
When Foreign Minister Abe assumed his office in the
Nakasone government, it appeared that he would carry on much
the same as his predecessors with regards to the USSR. When
questioned on Japan's position on the INF issue, he remarked
that this was an issue which must be worked out between the
US and USSR. Though a supporter of the Three Non-Nuclear
Principles, he also sees this constraint as depriving Japan
of any bargaining power when facing major international prob-
lems. He felt that Japan would have to "watch closely" the
progress of the INF negotiations before deciding what future
37
steps would be taken.
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's comment on the possi-
bility of transferring SS-20's from Europe to Asia rankled
the Japanese government and appeared to be the catalyst
that thrust Japan fully into the INF issue. No longer were
INF missiles something to be resolved only among the super-
powers. Japan threw itself fully behind the Western camp
and declared that it would actively participate in this inter-
national problem. Whether this reaction stemmed more from
concern of being within the Soviet missile envelope or more
from Japan's decision to no longer be insulted and intimi-
dated by the USSR is difficult to say.
By April 19 83, Foreign Minister Abe frequently spoke





"very big threat" and declaring that "Asia will not be
victimized" by moving SS-20's from Europe to Asia (a position
which was readily supported by China also)
.
39 Japan had
cast its lot to become an active participant in international
issues rather than just an observer. Japan began to address
issues previously avoided. When the Foreign Minister's
office dispatched UN Bureau Director-General Kadota to the
USSR in July 19 83, he was instructed to not only discuss
the INF issue, but also to address other global affairs in-
cluding Kampuchea and Afghanistan. Japan thus demonstrated
its intent to maintain a dialogue with the USSR (with a
broadened agenda) , but also reminded the Soviets that it
expected a visit by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko before
Japan's Foreign Minister again makes an official visit to
40the USSR.
Foreign Minister Abe continued his outspokenness on the
USSR after the KAL incident in September 1983. When the
USSR vetoed a UN draft resolution relating to the incident,
Abe remarked, "Probably no one will permit the Soviet Union's
shameless attitude. Opposed to the Soviet Union's continuing
to show such an illogical and insincere attitude, Japan will
continue to make all efforts for the clarification of the
41
facts.. ."
While assuming a new stance on international issues and
speaking out more frankly on Soviet-related incidents, this
does not confirm a significant degree of concern about the
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Soviet "threat." There is little to suggest that the Foreign
Minister's office supports any significant expansion of
Japan's defense programs, nor changes to the Constitution,
nor dramatic increases in the defense budget. The Foreign
Minister's job centers on diplomacy and Japan has indicated
its sincere interest in keeping the lines of communication
open between Tokyo and Moscow. However, the Foreign Minis-
ter has also made it clear that Japan expects to be regarded
with respect.
D. THE JAPAN DEFENSE AGENCY
In reviewing the positions of the Japan Defense Agency
over the years, one does not observe a tendency to concen-
trate on "worst-case" analyses as is more common in the US
Defense Department. The JDA up until the late 19 70's almost
singularly stressed diplomacy as the key to national security.
Only within recent years did its military responsibilities
seem to take on new dimensions.
Japan's Defense White Papers have routinely contained
charts and statistics on Soviet flights and ship passages
in the vicinity of Japan (such as Figure 2). Japan's concern
over not making waves in the early 19 70 *s can be seen in the
19 71 Defense White Paper in which the country conducting
the flights and ship passages around Japan is listed as
"unidentified." No countries were pointed out as particu-^
lar concerns for Japan. By the mid-19 70 's, the opinions
of the JDA reflected less certainty about peace in the
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Pacific. The JDA noted that building Japan's defenses too
rapidly would cause anxiety among other Asian nations but
also noted that if defense capabilities in the region were
weak, it would create a "power vacuum" that could be de-
stabilizing. With respect to Japan, the Japan-US security
arrangements make — full scale armed aggression against
Japan ... hardly conceivable. But limited aggression may be
considered a possibility." These comments seemed to infer
that a need existed for someone (the US) to keep the mili-
tary balance from drastically shifting. The paper goes on
to stress that diplomatic means will remain the primary
defensive action for Japan.
In 19 78, the JDA concluded that the US no longer held a
clear margin of superiority over the USSR in various military
capabilities. In an effort to stir up public support for
SDF improvements, the JDA discussed the role of military
power in "comprehensive security" and noted that when de-
terrence fails, military power then "becomes the most impor-
43tant means to protect the country's independence." Though
the developing situations around Japan were considered




The JDA was well aware of likely Soviet responses if
a Sino-Japanese treaty was concluded. An early 1978 JDA
analysis of Soviet reactions to the treaty predicted a build-
up of Soviet naval units, early deployment to the Pacific
61

of a Soviet aircraft carrier, early deployment of Backfire
bombers to the Far East, and increased Soviet harassment and
diplomatic pressure directed against Japan. 45 Thus, the JDA
was not surprised by Soviet military moves during the 19 78-79
period, only somewhat frustrated by Japan's helpless posi-
tion. As JDA Director General Kanemaru assessed Soviet
military strength around Japan in May 1978, "This is... [like]
...a situation of countering machine guns with bamboo
.,46spears.
"
In its next White Paper (19 79), the JDA observed:
. . . the Soviet Union is now strong enough to compete
with the US in nuclear war capability in general as
well as in conventional war capability in Europe
and the Far East... the Soviet Union is making it
difficult for the US to insure the. safety of air
and sea lines of communication. .
.
Soviet military expansion in the Far East was referred to
as an "increased potential threat." Though previous defense
equipment acquisition programs fell short of their goals,
the JDA now stressed that the goals of the current program
48
should be "reached as soon as possible."
References to the USSR as a "potential" threat (i.e.,
lacking interest in actually using military force against
Japan) continued in subsequent Defense White Papers. Even
the buildup of Soviet forces in the NorthernTerritories has
not been perceived as a direct threat on Japan, but rather
as part of a grand Soviet defensive plan and an effort to
put political pressure on Japan to drop the Northern Terri-
49
tories issue. The primary reason the JDA (as does much
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of Japan) has not shown greater concern over Soviet military
might which in areas such as Hokkaido is only a few miles
away from the main islands, is its tendency (at least until
more recent years) to not see Japan as an active part of
the security equation. The active participants were the US
and USSR. Almost all analyses promulgated by the JDA evalu-
ated the balance of power between the US and USSR. Increased
Soviet capabilities were evaluated with respect to US capa-
bilities, rather than with respect to their direct effect
on Japan and SDF capabilities. Japan, as spectator, sat in
the stands and kept score on the game between the super-
powers. This detached attitude was reflected in a comment
made by a JDA spokesman in 19 78 in response to a US advisory
to soon expect a Soviet aircraft carrier in the Far East.
The JDA representative remarked that "the combat and attack
power of the Soviet carrier-borne planes will not be great,
and the predominance of America's naval power, with the
Seventh Fleet as its mainstay, will not be upset."
Since the beginning of the 1980's, the JDA has begun to
proclaim a greater need for Japan to be able to handle its
own defense responsibilities (as set forth in the NDPO),
.
As Soviet military power has continued to grow in North-
east Asia and it has become more apparent that US capabili-
ties are globally stretched thin, Japan recognizes that it
needs to play a greater participatory role to maintain the
security of the country. In promoting Japan's increased
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responsibilities in this area, the JDA stated in its 19 82
Defense White Paper that "...military power is indispensable
for national security and also forms part of the framework
of international order."
Though the JDA may consider military power as indispen-
sable, it likewise considers security arrangements with the
US as indispensable. In essence, the JDA views Japan's
three pillars of defense as: 1) a strong public will to
preserve independence, 2) the effective consolidation of
defensive capabilities, and 3) maintaining the Japan-US
52Security Treaty.
The predominant views of the JDA on the USSR and defense
matters were probably best summed up in an Asia Pacific
Community article in the summer of 19 82 in which then JDA
53Director General Ito wrote:
a) Japan must be responsible for protecting itself but
"minimal M self-defense should not be exceeded.
b) The Soviet military buildup was mainly a reaction to
China and other Pacific nations (no mention is made
of Japan)
.
c) The restrictions of the Constitution and the Three
Non-Nuclear Principles should be upheld.
d) Japan's defense capability is insufficient, but it
is growing steadily.





f) It is doubtful that current defense goals can be
reached with less than 1% of GNP going to defense
each year.
g) the 19 76 NDPO should not be revised. Instead, goals
listed should be achieved in a timely manner.
The JDA pushes for more significant increases in the de-
fense budget and points out its difficulties in meeting
procurement plans because of the 1% ceiling, but its voice
does not carry significant weight within the Japanese govern-
ment. However, the JDA does realize the importance of build-
ing its own forces to form part of a credible deterrent and
within existing constraints, has acted to promote improve-
ments and modernization within the SDF (discussed in Chapter
VI). In assessing the overall Soviet "threat," the JDA
doubts that the USSR would attack Japan in the near future,
yet it predicts that the Soviets will continue to expand
militarily and use force where advantageous to gain politi-
cal leverage.
E. THE VIEWS OF THE OPPOSITION PARTIES
Difficulties arise in evaluating opposition parties'
views of the Soviet threat due to limited policy statements
on the subject. Specific policies on some defense matters
do exist though some parties have made modifications to
previous positions as they have become less practical in
the changing international environment.
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1. Japan Socialist Party (JSP)
As Japan's largest opposition party and the one
with the closest ties to the USSR, the JSP does not acknowledge
any Soviet "threat." The JSP was the only party which saw
benefit in Brezhnev's 1969 proposal for an Asian collective
security system and has routinely supported the conclusion
of a friendship treaty with the USSR as an important step
55towards peace.
According to JSP leaders, the problems that do
arise with the USSR mainly result from Japan's (i.e., LDP)
rhetoric and mishandling of situations. As an island nation,
they see little possibility of Japan becoming involved in a
war, unless Japan "creates a seed of trouble by itself."
The JSP feels that a rearmed Japan would invite problems
upon itself and that their position of "unarmed neutrality"
stands as the only means to achieve true security.
The JSP normally avoids ridiculing the Soviets.
When the Levchenko affair became of interest in Japan and
the LDP proposed the formation of a special investigative
committee to review the case, the JSP was the only party
which opposed the proposal. When KAL 007 was downed by the
Soviets, the JSP declined to condemn the Soviets, but rather
stated how the incident showed the necessity for global dis-
armament to preclude a reoccurrence of such an incident.
However, disagreements between the JSP and USSR do exist
on some issues. When the Soviet Communist Party sent a letter
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to the JSP in January 19 83 promising Soviet "guarantees"
for Japan's security if Japan pledged to strictly uphold its
Three Non-Nuclear Principles, the JSP's conditional response
assured the Soviets of the party's full support of the Three
Non-Nuclear Principles, but also reminded the Soviets that
return of the Northern Territories, removal of Soviet troops
from Afghanistan, and a pledge of non-interference in Poland
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should first be addressed. Basically, the JSP opposes
military pressure tactics by any country.
On other defense matters, the JSP has consistently
opposed the SDF and the Japan-US security arrangements.
The US has been viewed as an "imperialist" nation which will
likely lead Japan into dangerous international situations.
The SDF should be eventually dissolved and replaced by an
organization dedicated to civil development (e.g., public
work projects) . Japan should not enter into any military
alliances nor allow any foreign troops on its soil. Though
Japan's buildup of the SDF seems gradual by most standards,
it is anathema to the JSP. In response to the 19 81 JDA
Mid-term Estimate, the JSP declared that the plan "defines
the 1980's as an age of war and armaments expansion, and
it aims at constructing a military state structure, which
will shoulder a part of the world war between the US and the
Soviet Union."
The JSP strongly supports the current wording of the
Constitution and promotes the theme of global disarmament.
The JSP believes a policy of "non-alignment, neutrality,
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and all-directional diplomacy" 59 best suits the needs of
Japan. This strategy would enable Japan to become a member
of the world vice just a member of the West. 60
2. Japan Communist Party (JCP)
The JCP has had an erratic relationship with the
USSR in the postwar era. The Soviet Communist Party has
failed in keeping the JCP within its fold because the members
of the JCP are foremost, Japanese, and only secondarily,
Communists. The JCP certainly sees no threat posed by the
Soviets and would prefer a friendly but loose relationship
with the USSR. The JCP would welcome a friendship treaty
with the USSR but as a peace-oriented party, it opposes
"big-powerism, " which includes Soviet interventions in
Afghanistan, Poland, and the Northern Territories. The
Northern Territories issue transcends party differences.
No party can afford not to support the return of the Northern
Territories for it would be unpatriotic. In fact, the JCP's
position on the issue is the most demanding— it calls for
the return of all the Kurile Islands (quite unrealistic but
probably good for a few votes) . The autonomy of the JCP
from the Soviets was again evident after the Korean airliner
6 2
incident which the JCP described as "impermissable barbarity."
The JCP considers the US much more a threat than the
USSR. Following Prime Minister Nakasone's visit to the US
in January 1983, the JCP announced its concern over Japan
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becoming enmeshed in "Reagan's limited nuclear war plan."
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As with the JSP, the JCP views that the US is leading Japan
down a dangerous path. The JCP favors dissolving the Japan-
US Security Treaty and adopting a security policy dedicated
to "nonalignment, neutrality, and self-defense." The SDF
should eventually be disbanded after the members are "re-
educated" on the ills of their previous ways. Rather than a
formal SDF, the JCP envisions kind of a "peoples' war"
defense concept. As stated in the JCP's security position
paper
,
In the event of intervention or aggression, the right
of self-defense, an inalienable right of a sovereign
state, will be exercised. The country's independence
and safety will be protected by mobilizing every means
available, with the unity and support of the people.** 4
The JCP firmly supports the current Constitution and
the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. It sees Northeast Asia as
a low-threat environment in which Japan need not waste its
money on elaborate defense forces or depend on military
alliances for security.
3 . Komeito
Up until the 19 80's, Komeito opposed the SDF and the
Japan-US Security Treaty, and favored a position of neutrality
for the country. The party supported the transformation of
the SDF into a smaller national guard to meet defense needs.
The Japan-US Security Treaty should be discontinued and re-
placed by a Japan-US Friendship Treaty (.which would also be
desirable with other major nations such as the USSR and China).
A shift in the Komeito position occurred at its
18th convention in December 19 80. While claiming that the
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Security Treaty must eventually be phased out, the party
recognized it as serving Japan's interests for the time being
until improvements in global affairs could be achieved which
would no longer necessitate the Security Treaty. The con-
stitutionality of the SDF was recognized by Komeito for the
first time and again, though the shift to a national guard
should eventually take place, the SDF was acceptable as
long as its missions were "limited strictly to exclusively
defensive operations to protect the integrity of the nation's
territorial land, air, and sea and to maintain it in its
present form for the time being under strengthened civilian
control .
"
Komeito supports the current Constitution, the Three
Non-Nuclear Principles, and opposes increases in defense
allocations. Its decision to alter its security policies
were likely less related to increased concerns over the Soviet
"threat" than as a more realistic defense stance which would
have more voter appeal.
4 . Democratic Socialist Party (DSP)
Though socialist in name, the DSP is a conservative
party in nature. There is little reason to believe that
the DSP is overly concerned about the USSR but it does sup-
port an armed nation concept (non-nuclear) for defense pur-
poses and calls for maintaining the Japan-US Security Treaty.
The only opposition party which did not oppose proposed
technology transfer arrangements between Japan and the US,
the DSP supports Japan's alignment with the West and
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acknowledges Japan's responsibility to contribute to the
common defense. However, such efforts should be steered
by constitutional and budgetary constraints. However,
this does not mean accepting all existing programs as is.
The DSP has called for a critical review of the NDPO and
some of its leading members have advocated pushing defense
spending above 1% of GNP if it appears necessary to meet
6 7Japan ' s defense requirements
.
Of the major opposition parties, the DSP security
policies most closely resemble those of the LDP. Diplomacy
and other peace efforts form the core of DSP policy and
defense matters should always be subject to strong civilian
leadership. The DSP's 19 83 Action Policy related the essence
of the party's approach to improving international relations
when it stated, "We must make efforts to ease tension, to




5. New Liberal-Democratic Federation (NLDFl
The New Liberal Club and Socialist Democratic Federa-
tion joined forces in September 19 81 to create the NLDF.
It is the youngest and smallest of the opposition parties
and there is scant information available on their attitude
towards the USSR. The NLDF security platform is built
around "peace diplomacy" with the ultimate goal of global
disarmament. The party does not dispute Japan's Constitution
and strongly backs the Three Non-Nuclear Principles. It
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supports continued bilateral security arrangements with
the US and accepts the need for the SDF. It appears the
NLDF would favor continued budgetary restrictions on defense
spending since its security policy warns that "unbridled
69
rearmament must be avoided."
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IV. PERCEPTIONS OF SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS
Having sampled the attitudes of those who carry the
diplomatic torches in Japan, the economic ties between the
USSR and Japan will be examined (especially Siberian joint
ventures) , along with perceptions of Japanese business and
Japanese scholars. At first glance, it would appear that
Siberia's abundance of natural resources would offer a close
at hand cornucopia for resource starved Japan. When re-
viewing Soviet-Japanese economic linkages, it is important
to note the prospects for one nation gaining leverage over
the other and the potential for this impacting on the security
relations between the two countries.
Scholars in many countries constitute an important for-
eign policy interest group. The various perceptions of
Japanese scholars with respect to the USSR and security
matters will be reviewed, along with the potential influence
that this group holds.
\. JAPAN-SOVIET TRADE
Historically, Japan-Soviet trade has not been impressive.
Prior to World War II, neither Japan's exports or imports
ixceeded 2.5% of Japan's totals. Trade was nil during
lost of the Cold War years. Since the late 19 50's, Japan-
oviet trade has increased greatly but even by 19 82, it only
ccounted for 2% of overall Japanese trade. The pattern
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first half of 19 83 proved even more dismal. Japanese exports
were down 19.1% over the previous year and imports were down
424.7%. Japan's concern on the INF issue and decision to
align itself with the West may negatively affect Japan-Soviet
trade more than the Afghanistan issue. It remains to be
seen whether this is just a temporary shift or will have
longer range effects.
Currently, Japan's primary exports to the USSR consist of
iron and steel materials (in particular, steel pipe) . These
materials accounted for 40% of Japan's exports in 19 82. Heavy
5building machinery is another leading export item. Though
coal and timber had been Japan's leading imports from the
USSR in the 19 70's, gold became the major import by the early
1980's. Gold imports surged from $47 million in 1980 to
$535 million in 19 81. The promotion of gold is probably
viewed by the Soviets as a means to help reduce the growing
trade imbalance while also acquiring inputs of hard currency.
B. JAPAN'S INVOLVEMENT IN SIBERIA
One paradox that has plagued the USSR for many years
involves the fact that although Siberia appears to hold a
wealth of resources, the Soviet economy has been in such poor
condition that the country needs outside technology and
money to enable these resources to be harvested. As one
Soviet specialist on Siberia commented, "The cost of develop-
ing the much-heralded potential resources of Siberia is almost
prohibitive with standard technology, which is 20 to 30 years
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behind in the performance and capacity to operate in extreme
environments." The other half of the problem was summarized
quite nicely by another Soviet official when he commented,
"How much we could do if we only had money." 8 The lack of
Soviet technology has even restricted accurate or extensive
surveying of Siberian resources.
With Japan and the US possessing the leading high-
technology industries in the world, and since the US was
viewed by the Soviets as the less desirable business asso-
ciate, the USSR directed its primary efforts toward Japan.
In the mid-1960' s, the Soviets worked diligently to inter-
est Japan in various Siberian projects. One important factor
centered around Japan's willingness to accept natural re-
sources as partial payment for credits loaned. For the
Japanese, the appeal of joint Siberian projects lay in the
promise of useful products at lower prices and lower trans-
portation costs (due to geographic proximity)
.
In 19 66, the Soviet-Japanese Economic Committee came into
being as the planning forum for cooperative endeavors be-
tween Japan and the USSR. The first major Japan-Soviet
Siberian venture (contracted in July 19 68) involved timber
development. The agreement called for Japan to provide $163
million in supplies (mostly development equipment) in return
9
for 5 years of timber valued at $183 million.
In December 19 70, an agreement was signed between Japan
and the USSR for the development of a port facility at
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Wrangel (just east of Nakhodka) , to include construction of
three piers capable of heavy loading operations, and support
equipment for handling timber, gas, and coal. Japan would
supply $80 million worth of building equipment and materials.
According to the Soviets, the port of Wrangel was designed
to relieve the overloading of Nakhodka and to directly facili-
tate trade with Japan. it does not take much imagination
to also realize that a port with such heavy loading capabili-
ties could also have important military use as an additional
logistics support facility.
After five years of negotiations, a deal concerning wood
chip processing was concluded in 1972. Again, Japan provided
equipment (valued at $45 million) in return for the product.
Two years later, a further agreement encompassed additional
ventures in coal, timber, and gas for which Japan advanced
the Soviets $1,050 million in credits. 1975 found Japan
providing support for offshore oil exploration in the Sakhalin
12
area in return for 50% of the oil returns.
One joint project that failed to materialize occurred in
the 19 74-75 timeframe. Though initial attempts by the USSR
to interest Japan in assisting to build an oil pipeline
extending from western Siberia to the Soviet east coast v/ere
favorably received by Japn, prior to arrangements being
finalized, Tokyo backed out of the deal. Several factors
seemed to contribute to Japan's change of mind: 1) the poten-
tial strategic ramifications of the project Ci.e., a permanent
supply of oil to the Soviet Far East) ; 2) a reluctance to
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get so deeply involved financially in a project in which the
returns (oil to Japan) could so easily be cut off; 3) pressure
from the Chinese to refuse the offer; and 4) a Soviet cut-
back in promised delivery from 30-50 million tons/year to
1325 million tons/year.
By 19 78, Japanese national and private loans toward
Siberian projects totaled $3 billion (50% from each sector). 14
While it is not yet clear how mutually profitable the Siberian
projects will be for Japan and the USSR, it appears that
Japan intends to maintain some degree of involvement. Even
when the Soviet intervention into Afghanistan (December 19 79)
took place, Japan shared in the West's displeasure over the
incident, but it was reluctant to fully support an embargo
on equipment and loans to the USSR. Japan chose a compromise
position by freezing uncompleted contracts, but continued
delivery of credits under existing contracts. The Soviet-
Japanese 19 80 planning meeting on Siberian ventures took
place as scheduled and in April 1980, Japan stated its inten-
tions to exempt the Sakhalin offshore oil project from pre-
viously imposed restrictions and prepared to resume drilling
operations . When the US further tightened its embargo
requirements in June 19 82 (restricting oil and gas support
material manufactured in the US) , Japan formally objected,
claiming such action ran counter to international law and
could seriously damage Japan-Soviet trade. Desiring to
continue the Sakhalin projects, Japan decided to resume
drilling using available Soviet equipment vice Japanese
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17(dependent on US parts)
. After US sanctions were eased
in November 19 82, Japanese rigs again went into operation.
The first Japanese-Soviet contract concluded after the
modification of sanctions arranged for Japan to provide 50
1 ppipe layers for the prospective Siberian gas pipeline.
In 19 83, the primary ongoing joint Siberian projects con-
sisted of Sakhalin oil/gas and Yakutsk coking coal. Since
the late 19 70's, Japan has remained cautious about making
commitments in Siberia.
The Japanese government does not foresee that involve-
ment in Siberia (or overall trade with the USSR) will create
any Soviet leverage over Japan. A Japanese dependency does
not exist nor is one developing. Japanese officials have
indicated that Japan's dependency on individual Soviet re-
sources would probably not be allowed to exceed 20% of Japan's
needs. Thus far, Japan shows no indications of even approach-
ing such limits. Japanese estimates for 1990 reflect impor-
tation of Siberian coking coal at about 10% and Sakhalin oil
19
at 1%. As long as alternate sources exist for these re-
sources, Japan should maintain considerable economic freedom
to maneuver
.
C. PERCEPTIONS OF THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY
When a neighboring country such as the USSR offers a
multitude of profitable economic opportunities, one would
expect a competitive business community such as Japan's, to
downplay security problems between the two nations . Many
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Japanese businessmen believe that economic cooperation with
the USSR reduces the potential of a Soviet "threat." In
their opinion, by increasing economic contacts with the USSR,
Japan demonstrates that it is not opting to isolate its
neighbor which in turn, can help reduce Soviet-US tension in
Northeast Asia. Through greater cooperation, the probability
of armed confrontation can be reduced by minimizing misper-
ceptions and promoting greater understanding between the two
parties. If Japan refused to assist the USSR in the develop-
ment of Siberia, Soviet shortages might eventually develop
which could heighten tensions and cause the Soviets to
forcibly seek alternatives elsewhere (such as the Middle
East)
.
The tendency of the Japanese to focus on the positive
aspects of economic matters can be seen from a Japanese
project completed in 19 78 involving construction of a float-
ing drydock. Though the Japan Defense Agency had its doubts
about the project, Japan proceeded to build this 80,00 ton
floating drydock based on the Soviet's assurance that the
21dock was intended for merchant ships. Considering that
the dock is capable of docking a Kiev-class aircraft carrier
(CVHG) , that the drydock has been based in Vladivostok (one
of the primary military ports in the Soviet Pacific) , and
the fact that the Soviets do not possess any commercial
vessels in the Pacific of a size to warrant such a repair
platform, it provides some evidence that the dock may be
intended for extensive military use.
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Throughout the 19 70's, Japanese businessmen remained
optimistic about continued cooperative projects in Siberia
despite the obstacles that cropped up in working with the
Soviets, such as: Soviet bureaucratic red tape and resultant
delays, the tendency of the Soviets to alter plans without
conferring with the Japanese, the Soviets 1 argumentative
nature in concluding agreements, and the Soviet requirement
that goods bound for Japan be carried on Soviet vessels
(reducing financial opportunities for Japanese merchants)
.
These things notwithstanding, the Soviets did attempt to
22
meet contractual commitments.
With Afghanistan and the US-led levying of sanctions
against the USSR, reactions among Japanese businessmen were
mixed. While some hated to limit economic opportunities,
most followed the recommendation of Chairman Inayama of the
powerful Keidanren (Federation of Economic Organizations)
who supported US efforts, in the hope that pressure could be
brought to bear on the Soviets to encourage negotiations on
, . . . . . 23
arms limitations.
As it became apparent that Soviet behavior with respect
to Afghanistan was difficult to influence, increasing num-
bers of Japanese businessmen became eager to revitalize
Japan-Soviet trade relations. Seme felt shortchanged because
certain European countries showed limited regard for the
sanctions and made deals with the Soviets which Japan was
intentionally passing up. When the US sent a 250-man
81

business delegation to the USSR in November 1982, it further
stimulated the Japanese business community. As a result, a
2 50 -man Japanese business mission visited the USSR from
February 22-27, 1983. The mission was headed by Shigeo
Nagano, president of Japan's Chamber of Commerce. While the
Soviets hoped the mission would lay the groundwork for ex-
panded cooperation on Siberian projects, Nagano reflected
the shift in Japan's economic approach when he stated, "Our
aim is to discuss ordinary trade and existing economic rela-
tions with the Soviets.
. .that is, projects already underway."
Senior Soviet officials who met with the Japanese trade
delegation in the USSR, spoke of Soviet economic difficul-
ties, stressed the importance of Siberian development, and
recommended Japan lift its economic sanctions. They also
reminded their visitors that the USSR could always turn to
Western Europe if Japan was not interested in helping. The
Japanese did not pledge to resolve any specific issues but
expressed a sincere interest in expanding trade as possible
without defying sanctions. The willingness of the Japanese
businessmen to promote increased economic activity was
represented by Nagano's statement that resolution of the
Northern Territories issue was not a prerequisite to improv-
ing trade relations.
The USSR recognizes that its relations with the private
Japanese business sector are smoother than relations with
the Japanese government. The Soviets strive to stay on
the good side of these businessmen in hopes of creating
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discontent between business and government on the handling
of Soviet affairs. When Izvestia political affairs commenta-
tor A.E. Bobin visited Japan in March 19 83, he commented on
the Nagano trade mission thusly:
Mr. Nagano is considering the national interests of
Japan, in contrast to Prime Minister Nakasone. I
think that if Japan and the Soviet Union make the
most of the lessons learned from the Nagano trip to
the USSR, and make preparations carefully by April of
next year [next scheduled economic conference]
,
then it will become possible to achieve big results,
which will prove a plus for the two sides. 26
While Japanese businessmen are anxious to promote im-
proved trade with the Soviets, it appears doubtful that Japan
will again have the enthusiasm for developing Siberia which
it demonstrated in the late 1960's and the 1970 *s. Whether
by its own choice or resulting from pressure from the
government, Japan's business sector, for the time being
anyway, has become reluctant to commit itself to projects
which promote a stronger USSR. As Mitsubishi Shoji Presi-
dent Yohei Mimura remarked, future Japan-Soviet joint
ventures should concentrate on such areas as "light indus-
tries and commercial enterprises, which are helpful to the
27improvement of people's living..."
When Japan limits its view of the USSR to economic
matters only, the concept of "threat" seldom enters the
picture. Economically, the Soviets appear to have greater
needs from Japan than vice versa. The Soviets need money
and technology to develop Siberia and improve their overall
economy. They have few alternatives. The Japanese find
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QSoviet natural resources helpful, but adequate alternatives
exist. Considering the Soviets' additional need for grain
from the West (especially the US) , it tends to limit the
extent of pressure the USSR can currently exert on Japan.
However, the Soviet's potential to improve their self-
sufficiency in these areas appears much greater than Japan's
potential to overcome its current (and almost absolute)
dependency on imported resources.
Business attitudes towards various defense matters
generally support the positions of the LDP government.
However, there are some significant companies involved in
defense production which would heartily support a stronger
SDF and increased defense budget. A study by the Keidanren
Defense Production Committee in 19 77 recommended that Japan
reduce military imports, expand domestic defense production,
28
and eliminate the 1% ceiling on defense spending. Numer-
ous defense contractors would also like to see the ban on
weapons exports lifted. There has not been any significant
indications of business interests in changing Japan's nuclear
weapons policies though Japan's industries could likely
produce nuclear weapons within only a few years.
The interests of some industries is building a stronger
SDF appear derived more from profit motivation than as a
needed response to a perceived Soviet "threat." Underuti-
lized and hungry for new contracts, Japan's defense indus-
tries would welcome the opportunity to contribute more to
the defense of Japan.
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D. PERCEPTIONS OF SCHOLARS
Scholars in numerous countries have become influential
foreign policy interest groups. Their writings offer both
fresh ideas and continuous critiques of current policies.
In the US, scholars have the opportunity to have direct
impact on foreign policy since this group is frequently drawn
upon to fill posts in the governing administration. The
situation is not quite the same in Japan, but in recent
years, scholars have gained greater respect (and a wider
audience) for their opinions on foreign policy matters.
In the late 1970*s, as the taboos on discussing various defense
issues began to fall, Japanese scholars eagerly stepped in
to fill this void of silence. As an editor of a Japanese
magazine commented in 1980, "It may be that finally the time
has come in the debate on Japanese defense to 'let a hundred
29flowers bloom. 1 "
The views of Japanese scholars on the Soviet threat and
other defense matters range across a broad spectrum. Pro-
fessors Hiroshi Kimura and Mike Mochizuki have each provided
excellent categorizations for Japanese security views.
Kimura breaks down Japanese thinkers as either "pacifists,"
30
"realists," or "alarmists." Mochizuki refers to similar
groupings as either "unarmed neutralists," "political" and
"military realists," or "gaullists. "^l These categories
will be useful for the purposes of this paper.
1. Pacifists (Unarmed Neutralists)
The pacifists (unarmed neutralists) prefer to focus
on diplomatic and economic relations vice the military
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character of nations. Due to Japan's economic dependencies,
international cooperation is essential for Japan's survival
and military means only serve to endanger Japan's welfare.
This group strongly advocates disarmament and arms control.
With respect to the USSR, the pacifists claim that
the US has used scare tactics to mislead Japanese views of
the Soviets. In reality, the USSR is not as militarily
strong as portrayed, its economy is riddled with problems,
its international influence is declining, and attack on
Japan is highly unlikely. Diplomacy is the only answer for
32dealing with the Soviets. In the unlikely event that the
Soviets did attack, Michio Morishima suggests that the
Japanese "should surrender in an orderly manner, white
33flag and red flag in hand."
The SDF has historically been opposed by the paci-
fists, though some acceptance has occurred in recent years
as former criticisms have become less defensible. Others,
such as Takeshi Igarashi, continue to question the consti-
tutionality of the SDF and warn that "the very existence of
34
military might always constitutes a menace." Morishima
adds that "National security should be protected not by
military hardware but by software in the form of economic
and cultural cooperation with other countries."
The pacifists look upon the Japan-US security ar-
rangements with contempt. They believe that dependence on
one nation is undesirable, Japan should no longer suffer as
a pawn of US world strategy, and the US cannot be trusted
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to aid Japan in a crisis. Japan should dissolve the MST,
seek independent policies from the US, and work towards
contracting a multitude of friendship treaties in the
international domain.
Japan's pacifists consider any increase in defense
spending as "dangerous" and strongly support the "peace"
Constitution and all restrictions on defense which have been
established (e.g., 1% ceiling, ban on weapons exports, Three
Non-Nuclear Principles). Due to Japan's historical experi-
ences, they believe Japan has an obligation to play a leading
role in reducing nuclear arms in the world.
While the pacifists do not have the largest following
in Japan, their appeal remains extensive enough to act as
a "brake" on the Japanese government, creating resistance
to changes in defense policy.
2. Realists
The realists, which Mochizuki has further classified
as either "political" or "military" realists, reflect the
predominant current thought in Japan. In general, the
realists recognize that Japan should exercise extensive
economic and political responsibilities in global affairs,
and should militarily play a contributary (vice independent)
role in the defense of Japan. The political realists note
the importance of both internal and external factors in
determining security policies. They recognize that due
regard must be given to the pacifistic leanings still
existing in Japan. They recognize that the people are
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unwilling to readily support measures which would diminish
the economic prosperity to which they have grown accustomed.
Furthermore, it is not reasonable for Japan to assume an
autonomous military posture due to the high cost involved
and the anti-Japanese sentiment it would create in East
Asia. Japan's dependence on the outside world cannot be
overlooked and efforts should be made to reduce vulnerabili-
3 6ties and improve relations with major suppliers.
The military realists base their recommendations
on currently perceived military threats without restricting
options because of domestic constraints. They believe mili-
tary capabilities must be duly respected since intentions
can rapidly change and one might not have sufficient time
37to react unless prepared beforehand.
Most Japanese realists do not view the USSR as
overly threatening. As long as US-USSR forces remain rela-
tively balanced in the Pacific; they do not foresee the
Soviets taking direct action against Japan. Numerous
realists, such as Hiroshi Kimura, see the USSR as oppor-
tunistic. The Soviets usually will act to acquire easy
gains, but not take action where the risks are high (especially
the possibility of direct conflict with the US). In Kimura'
s
opinion, the USSR would prefer to "Finlandize" Japan (i.e.,
to gain direct influence without having to sacrifice the
38invaluable industrial base of the country) . Another
realist, Masamichi Inoki, head of the Research Institute for
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Peace and Security, believes the USSR has four goals with
respect to Japan:
1) To sever the US-Japan military nexus.
2) To prevent Japan from becoming a military power.
3) To preclude the formation of a tightly knit Japan-
China team.
4) To secure Japan's economic and technological capabili-
39ties to exploit Siberian resources.
To achieve such goals, most realists believe the Soviets
will employ various types of pressure tactics rather than
taking direct military action (though the Afghanistan inva-
sion made some less confident on this point) . The realists
normally envision attack by the Soviets only as a last resort,
but the potential threat is directly affected by the degree
of instability in the US-USSR military balance. As the US
loses its strategic edge, they see Japan with an increased
defense role.
The realists recognize the importance of building a
credible "defense" force but vary on the magnitude of the
buildup. In defining these differences, one might label
one group as "minimalists" and the other as "deterrents."
The "minimalists" advocate only enough improvements in the
SDF to provide an "exclusively defensive" defense which can
repel a small-scale attack for a short period of time.
The "deterrents" advocate achieving the NDPO goals as soon
as possible (some call for expanding the NDPO goals) in
order to create a defense force capable of blocking straits,
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defending sea lanes, and substantially raising the costs of
attack in order to deter potential aggressors.
Agreement exists among the realists on the necessity
of maintaining the Japan-US security arrangements. Some
would like the MST rewritten to reflect a truly "mutual"
40
security relationship but all appreciate its deterrent
effects. Makoto Momoi would further like to see Japan pro-
mote confidence building measures to form a type of "bonus
deterrence" (i.e., rewards to nations for steps taken to
avoid conflict)
. "Retaliatory deterrence" would remain
41
entrusted with the US. Masashi Nishihara sees a need for
Japan to go beyond security arrangements with the US . Be-
cause of similar vulnerabilities shared between Japan and
Western Europe with regards to US-USSR relations and energy
dependencies, he recommends that a new strategic relationship
be built between these two parties to protect their security
42interests. While the realists appreciate the need to carry
out cooperative policies with the US, some believe that US
attitudes toware the USSR are too narrow-minded and that care
should be taken to avoid isolating the Soviets. The realists
generally support Japan's decision to align itself with the
West, but they stress the importance of extending diplomatic
and economic opportunities to the USSR to promote improved
relations.
Realists ' attitudes toward defense spending differ
widely. Some political realists believe 1% of GNP should not
be exceeded because of domestic constraints, others feel
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increases are necessary as a symbol of Japans' sincerity to
support the Japan-US "alliance," and military realists
definitely recognize the need to go beyond the 1% ceiling
to build substantial defense forces. The Center for
Strategic Studies Institute (reflecting the military
realists' position) recommends that defense spending will
need to go as high as 2.5% of GNP by 19 86 to construct an
43
adequate defense.
On the question of Japan's Constitution, most realists
consider it a satisfactory framework within which to work,
some would like to see changes, but nearly all recognize
the unlikelihood of effecting revisions due to popular
support for the current document. On the nuclear issue,
most realists support the Three Non-Nuclear Principles
though some have recommended that the principles be modified
to two-and-a-half (permitting transit of US vessels with
44
nuclear weapons through Japanese territory! . The realists
prefer to remain under the US nuclear umbrella.
In summary, the prevailing realists' attitudes
reflect that:
1) Japan deserves international respect in political
as well as economic affairs.
2) Attack by the USSR is not likely, but should not be
discounted. Therefore, adequate defense forces should
be established to discourage such a future possibility.
3) Japan should build a comprehensive policy toward the
USSR. Diplomatic and economic options should remain
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open to encourage sincere, positive relations but
Japan expects the respect of an equal and will
resist intimidation.
4) Japan chooses to align itself with the West and will
maintain its security ties with the US.
3. Alarmists (Gaullists)
For the alarmists (gaullists) , Japan has not
developed proportionately in the postwar period. As a re-
sult, it is deformed. While possessing economic preponder-
ence, its military forces exist in a shriveled state. In
order to rectify these inequities, the legalities currently
restricting Japan such as the Constitution, the Three Non-
Nuclear Principles, the weapons export ban, and the 1%
ceiling should be scrapped and a new administrative frame-
45
work should be erected.
The alarmists view the USSR as an "aggressive, ex-
pansionist state energized and guided by Marxist-Leninist
ideology and influenced by its geographical location; the
increased military capability reflects the Soviet intention
of expansion; the Soviet threat to the West and Japan is to
46be taken seriously and considered to be imminent..."
In order for Japan to truly regain its sovereignty,
alarmists such as Tetsuya Kataoka contend that Japan must
rearm and become militarily self-reliant. US actions have
precluded Japan from "committing herself politically and
strategically," but it is naive to believe US forces would
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. 47readily come to aid Japan in an emergency. The SDF should
be significantly strengthened to attain offensive capabili-
ties including nuclear weapons
.
The alarmists consider the current MST insulting and
maintain that it should be rewritten to reflect full mutuality
They believe that the national interests of Japan and Japan-
US common interests would be best served by a militarily
independent Japan. Though the alarmists advocate a strong
military posture, it is interesting that no SDF officers of
any stature (either retired or active) champion the alarmist
48
approach. The alarmists remain a minor force in Japan.
A seriously alarming external stimulus would probably be
required to induce a sizeable shift to this line of thought
(such as considerable loss of confidence in the US or direct
49
military action against Japan)
Among the scholars, the three main groups of views
all reflect their own brand of nationalism. To an outside
observer, it is somewhat ironic that the Japanese viewpoint
which most mirrors Asian nationalism in the postwar period
(i.e., the alarmists), appears to be looked upon by the
majority of Japanese as the least appealing, as will be seen




As in previous chapters, priorities, views of the USSR,
and attitudes towards the SDF and other defense matters will
be reviewed to gain some insight on the Japanese general
public's perceptions of the Soviet "threat." The results of
opinion polls were used extensively in this evaluation and
while opinion polls have enjoyed much popularity in post-
war Japan, as with any opinion surveys, they should not be
regarded as indisputable reflections of Japanese thoughts,
but rather as indices of possible changes.
A. OUTLOOKS AND PRIORITIES
Militarism characterized Japan as it entered World War
II, and anti-militarism characterized the country as it
emerged from the Occupation in the early 19 50 's. These
attitudes became deeply entrenched in a society which felt
cheated by its former military leaders. Defeat for the
Japanese was not merely failure, it was insufferable.
Throughout their history, the Japanese had never experi-
enced defeat. They vowed that such shame should never
befall their country again. Since the ways of the military
had caused them to "bear the unbearable," other means were
sought to lead Japan to prosperity.
Within an island nation where economic recovery stood
as the top priority, it is not difficult to understand why
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minimal public concern arose over external affairs, espec-
ially with the "guarantee" of the US-Japan Security Treaty
in place to preclude such anxieties. "Lack of concern"
probably well describes the Japanese attitude towards foreign
affairs for many years following World War II. In a 1970
survey, 74% of those polled indicated their "main interests"
centered on domestic issues, while only 8% listed foreign
policy as a primary interest. The Japanese seem to view
foreign affairs as if these international events took place
on the other side of the window of Japan's house. They watch
external events, sometimes examining them closely, but do not
feel a sense of involvement until events directly impact on
Japan. Not only geographically insular, the Japanese have
formed somewhat insular attitudes. In one poll conducted
in 1970, 72% expressed little or no interest in defense
2
matters. The theory of "unarmed neutralism" appealed to
the anti-military sentiments of many during the Cold War
era. The proponents of this philosophy warned that the US-
Japan Security Treaty would entangle Japan in the US-USSR
confrontation. This line of thought promoted attitudes of
non- involvement. The 1970's and detente deflated the unarmed
neutralists* arguments, but deteriorating US-USSR relations
since the late 19 70's have again expanded the unarmed neu-
tralists' audience. A March 1981 Asahi poll found 30% of
3
the respondents favoring a stance of unarmed neutralism.
The Japanese are the most widely read people in the
world, but this does not equate to being "most aware" or
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"most concerned." Statistics for newspaper circulation in
19 79 showed that an average of 569 copies per 1000 people
were distributed (as compared to 282 per 1000 for the US)
.
Additionally, radios were owned by 777 out of each 1000
people and for televisions, 245 per 1000. 4 While this sug-
gests that the media has the potential to be quite influen-
tial in shaping opinions in Japan, until recent years, the
media (as well as most of Japan's leadership) showed little
interest in Japan's participation in international affairs.
The attitudes of the Japanese public are not only com-
plex, but sometimes seem contradictory. While the USSR and
Communism are both unpopular amongst the Japanese, minimal
interest exists in support of an explicit anti-Soviet
alliance. The Japanese prefer that security problems be
5
worked out by other nations. Though discussion of most
defense and military topics was formerly considered taboo by
many Japanese, events in the late 1970's (especially increased
Soviet operations around Japan and Afghanistan) brought such
controversial topics as non-nuclear principles, the defense
budget, revision of the Constitution, and size/deployment of
the SDF into more open debate. Again, one should not read
too much into this. Open discussion does not infer intentions
to make new commitments . Though the Japanese have grown more
comfortable in debating various security topics, demands
for change have not emerged. While new commitments may re-
main distant, the trend reflects greater awareness and
interest in international issues. A public survey by the
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Prime Minister's office in December 1981 exemplifies this
trend. Of 10,000 people surveyed (nationwide), 66% recog-
nized that the international situation had become more
severe. When asked what international problems concerned
them the most, they responded:
US-Soviet military balance 37%
Soviet forces in Northern Territories 36%
Problems in Poland 31%
Iran-Iraq dispute 19%
Table 1 (an excerpt from a survey conducted by the Atlan-
tic International Problems Research Institute in May 1983)
illustrates that Japanese "concerns" do not differ markedly
from those in the US and West Europe. The three major areas
of concern noted by the Japanese were "threat of war,"
"crime, " and "inflation. " A greater percentage of Japanese
(27%) than any other country listed "energy crisis" as a
major concern, which suggests the Japanese public's awareness
of their economic vulnerability. In response to this ques-
tion, as in all eleven survey questions on aspects of
security which were reported in this Asahi article, Japan
gave the highest percentage of "no answer" or "don't know"
responses than any other country which suggests less inter-
est in security matters than other countries.
One Diet member remarked that the Japanese have "entered
g
the halls of the nouveau riche . " Due to this relative
prosperity, self-interest among the Japanese has grown, along






































































































00 \o VO in r-» <o CN <3\





















CN 00 en CN •^








































































































and avoiding involvement in international affairs. This
tendency to avoid delving deeply into international problems
partially accounts for the continued popularity of the some-
what idealistic philosophy of "omni-directional" diplomacy,
in which Japan can enjoy friendly relations with all nations.
Though some say nationalism is growing among the Japanese,
this nationalism normally does not embrace a militaristic
nature.
B. THE USSR
As should be evident from earlier comments, history has
done little to foster a positive spirit between the Japanese
and Russians. In Japan, with its high level of education,
the public is well aware of these historical issues and con-
tinues to harbor negative feelings towards the Soviets. But
the Japanese are also a product of their environment and
just as attitudes towards China underwent significant change
in the 19 70's due to improved Japan-China relations, one
should not rule out a future positive change in Japan-Soviet
relations if facilitated by modifications in the external
environment.
In two separate public opinion polls conducted in 1249
,
the USSR ranked as the most unpopular country, while the
US ranked as the "most liked" country. This disparity in
attitudes towards two recent enemies was highly colored by
anti-Soviet feelings which emerged because of the perceived
Soviet betrayal of Japan in 1945 (by breaking the 1941
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Non-aggression Pact) , the elongated and oppressive Soviet
detainment of Japanese POW's, and the pro-American senti-
ments which grew out of the US Occupation. Though the Japanese
"disliked" the Soviets, it certainly did not mean that im-
proved relations were not desired. Three separate polls
conducted in the 19 52-53 timeframe reflected that approxi-
mately 50% of the Japanese favored a peace treaty with the
USSR while only 20% were opposed (30% fell into the "don't
know" category)
.
Routinely, less than 5% of Japanese polled have listed
the USSR as their "most liked" country, however, degree of
"dislike" has varied over the years. While in the early
19 60's, one set of polls indicated that about 50% of those
polled did not like the USSR, this decreased to 25% by the
early 1970's (during detente), and by the late 1970's, had
12increased to about 75%. The Northern Territories issue,
the Soviet military buildup in the Far East, and the invasion
of Afghanistan no doubt accounted for much of this change.
The hope of the early 19 70's was reflected in a 19 74 San -
kei poll on the desired level of relations with the Soviets:
More extensive relations 53%
Maintain status quo 34%
Less relations 11%
No relations 1%
Although the Japanese may have believed that expanded
relations with the Soviets would be worthwhile, the USSR's
position in the international hierarchy remained low as can
100

be seen from these polls conducted by the Asahi in 1971 and
1978 which asked which country Japan should maintain the
friendliest relations:





No answer 20 18
Asahi poll showed that only 3% of thos
foresaw closer relations with the USSR in the future. The
general feeling amongst the Japanese at the close of the
1970' s, was that relations with the USSR would remain "cool"
until the Northern Territories problem was resolved. In
the early 1980*3, the Japanese government and press enlightened
the public about a new obstacle in Japan-USSR relations
—
the Soviet SS-20's stationed in the Far East. Anti-Soviet
feelings intensified after Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's
remark on April 2, 1983 that the USSR might transfer SS-20's
from Europe to Asia. Though the Japanese press often takes
anti-government, anti-defense, and anti-American positions,
it reacted strongly against the Soviets * attitudes toward
SS-20*s in Asia. Soviet tactics further aggravated the
Japanese. Shortly following Gromyko's comments, Soviet
Premier Tikhonov remarked to Japanese Ambassador Takashima
that "There is no territorial problem between Japan and the
Soviet Union. Among the Japanese people, there is no
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distrust in the Soviet Union, and the territorial problem is
used as a means to plant it among them." Administrative-
level talks held between Japan and the USSR in April 198 3
did little to raise Japanese hopes for improvement. Edi-
torials from the Sankei, Tokyo , and Nihon Keizai all commented
on the futility of the talks, that the USSR did not appear
sincere about improving relations, that the SS-20's in
Siberia were fast becoming an important issue, and that the
new Soviet leader (Andropov) offered little hope for opti-
mism about future Japan-Soviet relations.
Except for Siberian resources, the Japanese find little
fascination in things Russian, and their interests in the
USSR are diminishing. The Japanese exhibit minimal desire
to travel to the USSR, only a few institutions on Soviet
studies exist in Japan, and dwindling numbers of students
18
study Russian. The current situation reflects no impend-
ing change in these negative Japanese attitudes towards the
USSR.
Since Japan regained its independence in 1952 (and also
gained a protective security pact from the US) , the Japanese
have had difficulty visualizing a military threat to their
country. In a 1970 poll conducted by the Central Research
Service in Tokyo, only 22% feared that "some country" might
attack Japan while 47% perceived no threat to Japan (31%
were undecided) . Of those fearing possible attack, China
19
ranked almost equally with the USSR as the major threat.
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With the detente of the early 1970's, Japanese threat per-
ceptions remained low and concern over China steadily faded
until it became negligible after the signing of the Sino-
Japanese Friendship Treaty in 1978. This left the USSR as
the sole major perceived threat. In a Yomiuri nationwide
poll in 1978, when asked if any country was considered a
threat, 57% listed the USSR, 10.8%—US, 10.5%—China, and
2010.4%—no threats. However, listing a country as a possi-
ble threat does not necessarily equate to fear of military
attack in the minds of the Japanese. An Asahi poll in 1978
found that the majority of respondents (54%) had no fear of
21
attack (33% feared attack) . While a large number of the
population did not foresee a possible attack on Japan, a
realization did exist that Japan might be involved in a con-
flict because of its position with respect to the major powers
in the area (US-USSR-China) . In a 19 78 public opinion
survey conducted by the Prime Minister's office, 44% of the
respondents considered that there was some danger of Japan
being attacked or becoming involved in war. 36% replied
22that "no danger" existed.
The degree of Japanese distaste for the USSR and the
perceptions of the Soviets as a serious "threat" conform poorly
with each other. This disparity was reflected in a 1979
Japanese survey in which only 17% of those who viewed
Japanese-Soviet relations as "not good" considered the USSR
23
as a military threat to Japan. This lack of concern about
the Soviet military can be partially attributed to lack of
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awareness. The press had shown little interest in Soviet
military movements around Japan until 19 78-79. Increased
press coverage stemmed from the changing US-USSR military
balance and the Soviet military buildup in the Northern
Territories. Though this increased the public's awareness
of Soviet military expansion in the region, the general
attitude expressed in the press did not portray an increased
threat to Japan, but tended to view Soviet moves as defen-
sive in nature, mainly to protect Soviet military assets
24in the Sea of Okhotsk. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
cast doubts about the defensive nature of the Soviets, and
increased Japanese awareness and concern. By 1981, a pub-
lic opinion poll conducted by the Prime Minister's office
indicated that public recognition of the danger of Japan
being attacked or involved in a war had increased from 44%
in 1978 to 60%, while those taking the stance that no danger
existed decreased from 36% (1978) to 21% (.19% were undecided)
Another question in this same 1981 poll indicated that 70%
of the respondents were "gravely concerned about the possi-
bility that Japan may be subject to foreign armed attack
25
or undue political pressure backed by military strength."
This demonstrated a public recognition that Japan was sub-
ject to external "pressures," but not necessarily that
attack was seriously possible.
The next incremental increase in defense concerns among
the Japanese took place during 1982-83 as the public became
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more aware of Soviet supersonic Backfire bombers and SS-20
INF missiles. The expanded publicity over Japan's location
within range of the 100-plus SS-20' s deployed in Siberia
spawned new fears in the country which had previously wit-
nessed the devastating effects of nuclear weapons . In an
editorial in the Asahi in July 19 83, Shunji Taoka asks why
so much rhetoric pours forth concerning SS-20 's when Japan
has been well within range of Soviet SS-5 missiles posi-
2 6tioned in the Far East since 1962. Greater public aware-
ness, strained Japan-Soviet relations, changes in the US^USSR
military balance, and anxieties about US willingness to
defend Japan may partially answer this question. Uneasiness
over Soviet military capabilities in Northeast Asia appears
to be gradually mounting. In a Tokyo Shimbun survey of
March 19 83 which asked to what degree the USSR was considered
27
a "threat," respondents answered:
Strongly feel the USSR is a threat 22.7%
USSR is a threat to some extent 35.4%
Not much of a threat 18.6%
Not at all 5.0%
That 58.1% considered the USSR a threat may represent in-
creased apprehension on the part of the Japanese, however,
this does not necessarily mean the need is recognized to do
more militarily to counter the Soviets.
After the KAL incident in September 19 83, the initial
Japanese public reaction reflected heightened concern
over Soviet military power. A Yomiuri poll within Tokyo
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found 91.6% regarded the USSR as a military threat to Japan
and in another poll, 4 6.3% of those questioned indicated
2 8that defense efforts should be increased. However,
rather than showering condemnation upon the Soviets, most
press articles emphasized a desire to learn the facts of the
incident. More concern was expressed as to why the jet was
off course rather than why the Soviets shot it down. 50
Japanese relatives of those killed sent a letter to KAL
blaming KAL for the incident since the plane had infringed
29
on Soviet territory. As can be seen in the following sta-
tistics from one survey, anti-Soviet responses were not highly
supported by the Japanese:
Request full explanation of incident 27.3%
Resolve compensation issue 8.5%
Protest to USSR 7.5%
Initial Japanese reactions mainly responded to the
"shock" of this incident. It is still too early to predict
the long range effects on the public. While it certainly
appears that distrust of the Soviets was confirmed, it re-
lated more to the Soviet delay in releasing the facts than
the actual act of shooting down the airliner. Future inter-
est is actually expanding the SDF and increasing the defense
budget will be more revealing of the true effect on the
public.
C. DEFENDING JAPAN
Once the Japanese possessed a "peace" Constitution and
a protective shield (the US-Japan Security Treaty) , it proved
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difficult for many Japanese to determine the extent of their
personal responsibility to defend the nation. When the
Japanese think of security, and particularly defense matters,
the use of military force does not readily materialize in
their minds. Part of this difficulty is historic in nature.
The Japanese have never had to fight an enemy within the
boundaries of the main islands. Nor have there been internal
rebellions which required a national response. Therefore,
scenarios concerning defense of the nation are sometimes
difficult to imagine. As Makoto Momoi puts it, in a country
centered on concensus decision-making, the defense problem
31
"bewilders" the people.
The lack of enthusiasm for assuming defense responsi-
bilities in the 1960's was apparent in a 1967 survey con-
ducted by Kyodo News Service amongst 24 00 people. When
asked how best to protect the security of Japan, responses
32
were:
Depend on joint protection under US-Japan
Security Treaty 16.9%
Strengthen SDF and independently protect
Japan 10.8%
Abolish MST and place security under UN 27.5%
Disarm and become neutral 22.5%
Even in 19 78, a poll by Asahi suggests that military
force was still not viewed as the primary means of defending
the country. When asked what stood as the most significant











1 in 1978 (Yomiuri)
,
only 15
they had a "great interest" in defense problems, 39% re-
34plied "some interest," and 28% said "not much interest."
Defense awareness may have increased between 1978 and
the early 19 80 's, but less reason exists to believe that
willingness to actively defend the country has increased.
1978 and 1981 surveys by the Prime Minister's office showed
35the following results on this issue:







Don ' t know
Resistance in event Japan is invaded (%1
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1978 1981
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The differences are too small to try to read anything into
them, but certainly, support for military responses to
emergencies witnessed no increase. Makoto Momoi made the
following observation on the subject:
The key conceptual difference between Japanese and
Americans concerns public attitudes toward national
security, and, in particular, toward the role of
the military in assuring security ... the Japanese
public is broadly skeptical about the utility of
military power as a means of assuring national
security. Most Japanese believe that military
power in itself does not symbolize either national
prestige or glory. Nor do they see it as effec--
gtively serving political or economic purposes...
While the tool of military force is still not broadly
supported even in defending the nation, there appears to
be a growing interest in arms control (especially since all
the publicity about SS-20's in Asia) and an increasing
awareness that Japan should be a participant in any such
37peace process.
D. THE PEOPLE AND THE SDF
The Japanese public's support for the SDF has improved
considerably since its establishment in 19 54. The following
statistics (%) from surveys by the Prime Minister's office
38
are pertinent:
1956 1959 1965 1969 1972 1975 1978 1981
Favor SDF 58 65 77 75 73 79 86 82
Oppose SDF 19 11 8 10 12 - 5 8
Other/
don ' t know
23 24 15 15 15 - 9 10
The public's favorable attitude towards the existence
of the SDF does not mean a comparable recognition of the SDF
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as the "defenders of the nation." Since the early 19 70's,
over 50% of the people have seen the aim of the SDF as
"national security" (high of 6 0% in 19 81 Prime Minister's
survey) , about 20% have considered "internal security" as
the primary aim, and about 13% responded "disaster-relief
operations." Though the public sees national security as
the actual main aim of the SDF, it was not until the 19 78
Prime Minister's poll that "national security" received
greater support than "disaster-relief operations" in the
public's view of where "future" SDF emphasis should be
placed. As for the public's view of "proven" effectiveness,
over 70% have consistently stated that the SDF has been most
useful in "disaster-relief operations" while less than 10%
39
replied "national defense." Questions about US defense
credibility stemming from the withdrawal from Vietnam and
the proposed troop withdrawal from the ROK may have been
major contributing factors to this changing perception about
the "future" role of the SDF. If this were true, one might
expect to see a trend supporting a significantly stronger
SDF. However, as these statistics C%X indicate, such has not
been the case:




Don ' t know
Though it appears more of the public now see a need for a
stronger SDF than in the days of detente in early 19 70's, the
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17 16 9 22 22
51 53 62 53 52
15 12 5 6 10
17 19 24 19 16

majority of the people remain content with the status quo .
Even when Yomiuri asked (April 1978) if Japan's forces
should be strengthened in light of possible US military
detachment from Asia, 31% replied "yes," 22% replied "no,"
41
and 4 7% fell into the "don't know" category.
The public remains ambiguous in its perceptions of how
the SDF can and should contribute to the defense of Japan.
Recognition of the SDF's role in "national defense" has im-
proved, but anxieties over a strong military preclude con-
census support for a rapid military buildup. The JDA, in
its 1982 Defense White Paper, sums up the public's position
by stating that it "seems to reflect the difficulty which
the people have in understanding the significance and role of
the SDF as [a] deterrent—something largely invisible to the
42public eye, yet essential to national security."
E. THE US AND THE MST
Japan has maintained a security pact with the US since
1951. Public opinion polls suggest that the Japanese have not
only grown accustomed to this defense arrangement, but have
come to prefer the relationship Cor have resigned themselves
that no other reasonable way exists to protect Japan) . As
can be seen from the following surveys by the Prime Minister's
office, support for the MST-SDF combination has steadily
grown since the early 1970's:
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1969 1972 1975 1978 1981
Continue MST plus SDF
for security 41% 41% 54% 61% 65%
Abolish MST and build
independent defense 13% 11% 9% 8% 6%
Abolish MST and reduce
SDF 10% 16% 9% 5% 7%
Possibly the marked increase in support for the "MST plus
SDF" between 19 72 and 19 75 could be attributed to the acute
vulnerability witnessed by the Japanese during the 1973 oil
embargo when they may have also recognized the inadequacy
of the SDF alone. The MST itself is recognized as a posi-
tive factor in Japan's security. When asked if the MST
"contributed to Japan's peace and safety," 66% of those
surveyed in both 19 78 and 19 81 gave affirmative replies
(though 36% said "yes, with reservations").. Only 12% gave
44
negative responses (both polls) . These attitudes were
also shown in a November 19 78 Asahi poll in which 49% of
the respondents indicated the MST supported Japanese inter-
ests while 13% said the treaty was not in the interests of
45Japan
.
Interestingly, though the MST is viewed as an important
segment of Japan's security posture, confidence in US
willingness to actually come to Japan's assistance in an








Other/don ' t know 40.9% 24%
With such doubts about US resolve, one might think the
Japanese would strive to build greater self-reliability but
as can be seen from previously mentioned polls, increased
support for a stronger SDF has been minimal. This reluctance
to build up defense capabilities can also be seen in the
public's attitude towards US pressure on Japan for greater
defense efforts. A 19 81 Yomiuri poll showed only 8.7%
accepted US pressure positively, 32.7% accepted pressure
47
reluctantly Cwithin limits), and 44.6% preferred "resistance."
Though much publicity has surfaced in Japan in recent
years about possible shifts in the US-USSR military balance
in the region, a survey conducted by USIA in November 19 82
showed that the Japanese believed that US and Soviet military
power were essentially equal and that this equivalency would
48
still persist in 1990. Thus, from the above, it appears
that the Japanese believe in the necessity of the MST, see
US military capabilities at parity with the USSR, but
question the willingness of the American people to actually
fight to protect Japan.
F. VIEWS ON OTHER SECURITY ISSUES
The Japanese public's attitude towards the defense bud-
get again shows support for the status quo as the preferred
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option. Little change occurred between the 19 78 and 1981
polls by the Prime Minister's office except for somewhat of
an increase in those favoring reducing defense spending (in
49spite of the Soviet military buildup and Afghanistan)
:
1978 1981
Expand budget 20% 20%
Maintain current budget 4 8% 4 7%
Reduce budget 10% 15%
Don't know 22% 18%
Regarding the Japanese Constitution, though the author-
ship may have been primarily American, its "peaceful" nature
has appealed to most Japanese. Though defense issues have
been more actively discussed in recent years, the masses
have shown little interest in changing the Constitution. The
majority of the people still support the Article 9 "no war
clause." Towards the Constitution as a whole, an April
19 81 Yomiuri poll showed 69% "generally agreed" with the
Constitution, 10.5% "generally disagreed," and 20.5% gave
"don't know" responses. When the same poll asked if the
Constitution should be revised, 4 3.9% responded that this was
"undesireable, " 2 7.8% said it was "desirable," and 2 8.3%
said they "didn't know." Even though the majority of the
Japanese support the SDF, a November 19 78 Asahi survey re-
flected that 71% of those polled opposed amending the Con-
52
stitution to allow Japan to possess armed forces. The
Japanese public seems satisfied to accept the constitutionally
questionable SDF "as is" rather than risk recognizing
"military" forces which might adopt "offensive" characteristics
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Concerning the nuclear weapons option, most Japanese have
consistently opposed the acquisition of nuclear weapons by
Japan. When two newspapers in 19 75 surveyed the attitudes




Agree (with "principles") 67% 77%
Disagree 23% 10%
Don ' t know 10% 9%
An Asahi poll in March 19 81 showed similar attitudes in the
early 19 80's (71% of the respondents indicated their opposi-
54tion to nuclear weapons for Japan)
.
The Japanese thus far appear steadfast in their opposi-
tion to nuclear weapons either possessed by or present
within the boundaries of Japanese territory, yet the public
doubts whether the Japanese government strictly upholds the
third principle (no introduction of nuclear weapons into
Japan) . The question most often arises when major US Navy
combatants make port calls in Japan. The Japanese govern-
ment consistently infers that the non-nuclear principles
are being followed, and this reassurance seems to placate
the masses, though as this 19 75 Asahi poll suggests, the





Do you think the principle of not allowing nuclear





This discontinuity may seem odd to an outsider, but the
Japanese seem either willing to turn their eyes once they
are told something does not exist and/or their level of
concern is so low, they prefer to overlook the issue.
Overall, popular perceptions reflect trends of increasing
concern for the Soviets, increasing support for the SDF
and the Japan-US security arrangements, and a growing
awareness that Japan should do more in its defense efforts.
A September 19 83 nationwide survey by Yomiuri indicated that
while 4 5.2% of the respondents considered Japan's defense
56
efforts sufficient, 39.5% considered efforts insufficient.
This closing of the gap appears to reflect that fundamental
changes in Japanese attitudes toward defense are taking
place. However, these changes are not rapidly occurring
as lingering anti-military sentiment work to keep the reins




VI. DEFENSE TRENDS IN JAPAN
Attitudes of various Japanese communities have been
examined but also of relevance are the actual defense
measures which Japan has taken and how (or whether) they
relate to the perceived Soviet "threat."
A. JAPAN'S DEFENSE PLANS
As discussed earlier, the initial plans to rearm Japan
in the early 1950's were neither originated by nor enthu-
siastically supported by Japan. Prime Minister Yoshida's
primary interests centered on independence and the oppor-
tunity for Japan to regain prosperity under a protective
US security cloak. A formerly classified Japan-US document
from this period relates that "Simultaneously with the coming
into force of the Peace Treaty and the Japanese-American
Security Cooperation Agreement, it will be necessary for
Japan to embark upon a program of rearmament." This require-
ment called for a force of 50,000 troops to be created in
addition to the National Police Reserve. Japan's initial
Self-Defense Forces may have resulted from US concerns over"
the USSR, but certainly not from Japan's concerns.
In May 19 57, Japan's Cabinet approved the Basic Policy
for National Defense (see Appendix A) . The Basic Policy
rationalizes the necessity for the SDF and reaffirms Japan's
defense dependence on the US. One of the principles of the
117

Basic Policy aims to "...develop progressively the effective
defense capabilities necessary for self-defense, with due
regard to the nation's resources and the prevailing domestic
situation." In essence, the domestic environment vice the
international environment was to be the dominant factor
determining the development of defense policies.
Four five-year defense buildup plans followed the 19 57
Basic Policy for National Defense. These plans included
specific goals for expanding the defense capabilities of
Japan. The fourth five-year plan (which ended in 19 76)
fell far short of its mark in meeting equipment acquisition
goals. Rising equipment costs and budgetary restrictions
were cited as reasons for unfulfilled goals, but such cuts
also reflect limited concern about external threats. In
19 76, vice a new defense plan, the government initiated a
National Defense Program Outline (.NDPO). . Unlike previous
plans, the NDPO avoided setting target dates for achieving
objectives. Established in the same year that the 1% defense
spending ceiling was officially recognized, the Miki govern-
ment seemed determined to hold down the level of defense
spending and concentrate on qualitative vice quantitative
improvements. An extensive document, the NDPO sums up
Japan's defense responsibilities as follows:
. .
.
Assuming that the international political structure
in this region—along with continuing efforts for
global stabilization
—
will not undergo any major
changes for some time to come , and that Japan ' s domestic
conditions will also remain fundamentally stable,
the most appropriate defense goal would seem to be
the maintenance of a full surveillance posture in
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peacetime and the ability to cope effectively with
situations up to the point of limited and small-scale
aggression . (my emphasis)
In describing the regional situation in 19 76, the NDPO
considered the region around Japan in a state of "equili-
brium" between the USSR, US, and China. According to JDA
Director-General Sakata in 19 76, one of the primary goals
of the NDPO was to sway the public towards greater support
of defense issues: "The NDPO is a watershed in postwar
defense policy not because it marked a major departure in
military policy, but because it helped create an environment
in which the open discussion of security issues was no longer
taboo." Some add that Japan also sought to solidify the US
commitment to Japan by demonstrating an effort to make de-
2fense improvements (though it could also be argued that
during these years of US cutbacks in Asia, Japan's reorien-
tation away from quantitative increases may have been designed
to keep the US commitment by ensuring Japan ' s forces did not
reach a level of self-sufficiency)
.
To better manage the programs laid out in the NDPO,
the JDA draws up the Mid-Term Defense Program Estimate every
three years (beginning in 19 78) . The latest of these esti-
mates Cchugyo ) was formulated in 19 81 and is referred to as
the "56 Chugyo" (1981 was the 56th year of the Showa era!
.
Intended as an internal planning document of the JDA, the
"56 Chugyo" presents an outline for FY 19 83-87 to basically
achieve the goals of the NDPO. Based on the "56 Chugyo,"
119

the JDA submits requests annually for approval. While the
Cabinet reviewed the "56 Chugyo" when first introduced, it
merely acknowledged the document rather than suggesting
any approval of it. As a result, yearly submissions by the
JDA may or may not be approved in full, depending on various
conditions at the time. The basic result is a long range
plan that always has the potential to become longer, but
seldom shorter. Although the JDA has recommended that the
goals of the NDPO be achieved as soon as possible, budgetary
restrictions thus far have caused both JDA officials and
private research institutes to predict that the "56 Chugyo"
goals will not even be achieved by 19 87. A sense of urgency
does not seem to exist.
Many would argue that the international environment has
changed significantly enough since 1976 to warrant a criti-
cal review of the NDPO. However, no such move appears near
at hand. Essentially, the core of Japan's defense policy
remains the 1957 Basic Policy for National Defense.
B. DEFENSE SPENDING
The average percentage of GNP dedicated to defense among
the Western nations (NATO plus Japan), was 2.9% in 1981 com-
pared to less than 1% for Japan. On the positive side, by
NATO's formula for computing defense spending, Japan's ex-
penditures increased from $5.71 billion in 1971 to $10.57
billion in 19 81 which upped its ranking among this group
from sixth to fifth position. This monetary change represented
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an 85% increase, the highest of any major industrialized
3nation (only Turkey and Greece exceeded this increase)
.
Among non-nuclear countries, Japan ranks third in defense
expenditures. While the US has encouraged NATO to attain
3% real growth in defense outlays, few have been able to
meet the challenge in recent years (exceptions—UK, Canada,
and Luxemburg) . However, Japan has easily topped this
4NATO goal each year.
In spite of the fact that most of Japan's government
components in the last couple of years have endured budget
cuts (up to 10%) , the defense budget has continued to in-
crease at a rate exceeding 6%. Additionally, changes have
taken place within the budget which reflect realignments of
priorities. The percentage of the defense budget going
towards "personnel and provisions" decreased from 56% in
19 76 to 4 6.6% in 1982 while expenditures on "equipment"
rose from 16.4% to 22.4% in the same time period land
reached 24% in 19 83) . Another point worthy of note is the
fact that the US bases located in Japan are provided rent
free (in contrast to Philippine bases) and Japan contributes
over $1 billion/year in support of these facilities.
The above notwithstanding, the fact remains that Japan
has not felt it necessary to meet the minimum requests
submitted by the JDA. The "1% ceiling" continues to have a
kind of impenetrable aura about it. For FY 1984, the JDA
indicated an 8.9% increase was required over the previous
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year's defense budget. When negotiations were completed on
the rough estimate budget in July 19 83, only a 6.88% defense
increase was approved. Even though the JDA had previously
stated that increases of at least 8.5% were needed (through
19 87) in order to attain the "56 Chugyo" goals, concern
within the government was insufficient to support these re-
quests. LDP Executive Board Chairman Hosoda labelled the
6.88% increase as insufficient to carry out Japan's pledges
to the US and called for a greater increase, even if 1% of
7GNP was surpassed. Even in this concern expressed by a
leading LDP Diet member, emphasis was placed on meeting US
expectations vice meeting a specific external threat.
In a related security area, Japan has realized it can
contribute towards the international welfare through its
Overseas Development Assistance CODA! program. Readily
accepting this responsibility, Japan's economic assistance
underwent significant increases from 19 71-19 81. In 19 81,
its ODA expenditures reached $3.17 billion which ranked it
third among the Western nations Ctied with West Germany).
,
o
behind only the US and France. After the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan, Japan boosted its economic assistance to
Pakistan, Turkey, and Thailand. More recently (.19 83) , it
increased its assistance to Jamaica and Honduras, and pledged
to provide a ¥ 300 million grant to El Salvador, while re-
fusing to reestablish aid to Nicaragua. Steps such as
these, exemplify the type of action Japan can take in response
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to perceived destabilizing activities. Japan's justification
for these moves was because it "wishes to keep in step with
9the US and others." For the five year period 1980-84,
it is estimated that Japan will pass out $21.4 billion in
ODA which will double its previous five year effort.
C. NEW EQUIPMENT IN THE SDF
Though some of the equipment within the SDF reflects a
certain degree of antiquity, recent construction and procure-
ment programs exhibit the rapid approach of an impressive
level of modernization. The question to be answered is
whether these improvements can predominantly be traced to
concern for the Soviet "threat," or whether other factors
such as US pressure or bureaucratic politics within the SDF
have been largely responsible.
1. Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF)
In the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) , the primary
battle tank for many years was the Type-61 (introduced in
1961) . Outdated, these tanks are gradually being replaced
by the Type-74 (introduced in 19 75) . Well respected for its
capabilities, the Type 74*s numbered 350 in use as of 1982
(plus 560 Type-61) with plans to reach a total of 465 Type-
74 ' s by the end of FY 19 83. Development of a new main battle
tank (Type-88) began in 19 76 which if on schedule, will
begin to enter the field in 19 88. Though both the Type-
61 and Type-74 tanks have been domestically produced (Misu-
bishi) , the Type-88 will probably have a foreign manufactured
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120mm gun (from West Germany) and its armor plating may
also come from a foreign source. This change in policy re-
portedly will enable the Japanese to get a better gun,
improve interoperability with other Western nations, and
help reduce trade tensions (the latter possibly being the
primary reason)
.
Though a new 155mm self-propelled howitzer (SPH)
was introduced in 19 78, research has already begun on a new
model (as of 19 83) . Recognizing the need for effective com-
munications in the field, 10 Type-82 command communications
vehicles were ordered in FY 1982. There were none in the
inventory previously. Another new addition will be the
AH-1S anti-tank helicopter, 12 of which were ordered in FY
19 82. These helicopters carry anti-tank missiles which have
an effective range of about 4 km. Research efforts are
also being conducted to develop an effective land-to-ship
missile to enable the GSDF to take action against enemy
i -4.12naval units.
The recent development of a laser-guided anti-tank
missile by Kawasaki Heavy Industries will enhance GSDF
capabilities when it enters the field in 19 85. The missile
13
is considered to be quite advanced by Western standards.
Many of the above programs began prior to 1978 when
the last surge of Soviet military capabilities commenced in
the region. Therefore, there is little reason to believe
these programs resulted much from a perceived external
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threat. The communications improvements relate directly to
a major weakness which continues to plague the SDF , and had
been long needed with or without external stimuli. The
most recent developments (AH-1S helicopter, land-to-ship
missiles, and laser-guided anti-tank missiles) bear a stronger
relation to perceived threat perceptions. With the signifi-
cant Soviet military buildup in the Northern Territories,
the Soviets have improved their ability to make an amphibi-
ous landing on Japan (Hokkaido) . Though many Japanese con-
sider this unlikely, it is one of the few scenarios which
the GSDF can realistically focus on. While these recent
improvements may be related to concern over a Soviet landing
in Japan, it is difficult to say that they are not just as
much the result of bureaucratic haggling to insure the GSDF
gets its share of improvements along with the other services.
2. Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF)
When one views the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF)
,
he cannot help but notice the newness of most of these ves-
sels. Of a total of 62 major combatants (DE and larger,
including submarines) as of 19 83, 44 were built within the
last 15 years (71%) . Moreover, as can be seen below, new
construction since 19 79 reflects the emphasis being placed
on improving ASW capabilities (figures in parentheses
14indicate planned units I:
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DDG DDH DD DE SS MSC
1979 1 2
1980 1 1 3
1981 1 1 1 2
1982 1 1 2
1983 1 1 1 1 2
1984 (3) (1) (1) (2)
1985 (2) (1) (2)
1986 (1) (1) (2) (1)
Recent improvements in the MSDF include the addition
of TASS (Towed Array Surveillance System) which has already
been installed on the latest DDH ( Kurama ) and will be added
to other destroyer-type ships in the future. This passive
ASW sensing system offers a marked improvement in submarine
detection effectiveness over active sonar systems. Anti-
ship capabilities have been enhanced by the addition of
Harpoon surface-to-surface missile systems in four ships thus
far and will be placed in most new construction units.
Beginning in 19 80, Harpoon was also added to all new con-
struction Yushio-class submarines. To improve survivability
in an air attack environment , most major units are scheduled
to get Point Defense missile systems and/or CIWS (Close-in
Weapons System—a rapid fire gatling gun-like system used
against high speed incoming missilesl. These new systems
are being procured from the US and represent the latest
systems currently in use onboard US Navy ships.
In reviewing the pattern of MSDF ship construction,
it is evident that minesweeping units have been a continuing
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priority over the years. Since 19 67, 39 minesweeping units
have entered the fleet (33 MSC's and 6 MSB's) . Japan's
minesweeping force (which also includes nine KV10 711 heli-
copters) is impressive by any standard. US Navy capabili-
ties pale in comparison. Though new programs have been
initiated, current US Navy assets are aged and less than a
handful are in active service. Japan has maintained a
proficient minesweeping capability throughout the postwar
period. Obviously, the ability to keep critical harbors
and restricted waterways clear of mines has remained a high
priority for Japan. Current minesweeping assets would also
prove invaluable in clearing channels were the straits
around Japan mined. However, the consistent building pat-
tern of minesweepers with no increased rate of production
in recent years, suggests little change in defense philosophy,
With US cutbacks in minesweepers over the past 30 years,
perhaps the US has encouraged Japan to maintain a credible
minesweeping force, in hopes that these units might be
available in a crisis situation (reminiscent of Japanese
minesweepers utilized during the Korean War ) . In reality,
this may be a naive expectation of the more independent
Japan of today's world.
Another significant addition to the MSDF has been the
procurement of P-3C ASW aircraft from the US. Again, this
is highly advanced equipment with superlative ASW capabili-
ties. The first three P-3C's arrived in Japan in 19 81, five
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more in 1982, and a total of 72 are planned for acquisition.
1
6
The first P-3C squadron was established at Atsugi in 1982.
Qualitative improvements in the MSDF since the late
1970*s have been significant, especially in strengthening
ASW and AAW capabilities. While these programs may have
been considerably influenced by the US, the modifications
do represent marked improvements in weaknesses relating
directly to the Soviet naval posture in the vicinity of
Japan. Also noteworthy is that many systems being acquired
by Japan are the most sophisticated available to US Navy
units. A system such as Harpoon, not only vastly improves
defense capabilities, but also represents the best offensive
anti-ship missile available to most US ships. Japan's
concentrated efforts to acquire such sophisticated ASW and
AAW weapons and sensors since the later 19 70*s suggest sub-
stantial concern for Soviet military capabilities.
3. Air Self Defense Force CASDF)
The Air Self-Defense Force CASDF) has also had its
share of improvements. The F-4EJ's have acted as the pri-
mary interceptors of the ASDF since 1969. To compensate
for their age, equipment updates will be introduced including
an improved radar, new air-to-air missiles, and a new fire
control system for greater bombing accuracy. Though a bomb-
ing system was not installed in the original planes because
they were considered "offensive" in nature, the 19 81 and
19 82 budgets authorized funds to install these computer-based
firing systems. When some Diet members became aware of these
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changes, they questioned Prime Minister Suzuki who claimed
he had not been informed of the true impact of the equipment
17
changes. The JDA explained the reasoning for the modifica-
tion thusly, "...equipment which the country is allowed to
possess within the framework of the above policy [i.e., no
aggressive or offensive equipment] may change, depending on
changes in the prevailing situation, such as progress in
18
military technology." This incident provides an excellent
example of the elasticity of Japanese regulations. Though
Japanese policies seem extremely difficult to "officially"
change, their interpretations may be modified from time to
time to meet certain needs. This flexibility satisfies two
requirements: 1) what needs to get done, gets done and
2) the people feel assured that policies will not be changed
without their direct support. In reality, the above example
intimates that certain changes deemed necessary by a govern-
mental department such as the JDA, may at times be initiated
without the explicit approval (or knowledge) of the majority
of Japanese within or outside of the normal government decision-
making process.
A big boost to the ASDF will result from the acqui-
sition of the sophisticated F-15 fighter, developed in the
US. This aircraft can reach speeds greater than mach 2.5
and can carry an impressive array of armaments. Japan has
ordered approximately 150 of these planes, 14 of which were
19delivered in March 19 81.
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To begin building an airborne early warning (AEW)
capability and supplement ground radar facilities, two E-2C's
were procured from the US in 19 82. These planes can conduct
a 360° search out to 260 nautical miles, track up to 250
targets, and coordinate 30 intercepts. Japan intends to
acquire at least 8 of these aircraft.
These attempts to fill the gaps in air detection
and intercept capabilities in recent years represent a
response to the most likely threat to Japan (i.e., bomber
or missile strikes) . The only country that poses this threat
is the USSR and such strikes can be effected within minutes
due to the close proximity of the two countries. The procure-
ment of early warning and fast reaction aircraft such as the
E-2C and F-15 signify a recognition by Japan of this defense
vulnerability, however the lengthy time involved in actually
acquiring this equipment implies that the Japanese government
as a whole does not feel a sense of urgency in reducing these
vulnerabilities. The 6.88% cap placed on defense increases
for FY 19 84 will cause hardships for the JDA, which has indi-
cated it plans to make cuts in the areas of personnel and
training support. However, the JDA intends to proceed with
equipment procurement plans to meet the "56 Chugyo" goals
even if it involves delaying payments to the defense indus-
try. As a result, the indebtedness of the JDA continues to
grow and it is only a matter of time until increased monies





One weakness which Japan will likely never overcome is
its resource dependence on other nations. Resource poor,
Japan depends on a free flow of imports for its livelihood,
The following is a sample of the quantities of certain
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In recent years, Japan attempted to reduce certain
economic vulnerabilities, especially Middle East oil, by
pursuing resource diversification, energy substitutes, and
conservation efforts. In 1981, crude oil consumption dropped
9.7% and oil imports decreased 10.4%. Of total oil imports,
Middle East oil imports declined from 73.2% in 19 80 to 69%
in 1981 (other major suppliers were Indonesia, Mexico, and
China) . Though crude oil still accounted for 62% of all




To reduce its oil dependence, Japan is also turning
more to coal, liquified natural gas (LNG) , and nuclear
power as energy sources. A 19 83 report by Japan's Compre-
hensive Energy Research Council estimated that by 1990,
increases in LNG and coal usage will continue, and atomic
energy consumption will double. The report also recommends
decreasing efforts in pursuit of oil substitutes due to the
current availability and low cost of oil. The Council pre-
dicted that MITI's target to reduce oil dependence to 49%













Oil 49.1 52 48
Coal 18.5 19.5 17.6-18.5 17.3-20.3
Atomic 6.9 11.3 10.5-11.1 14.9-15.7
LNG 6.9 11.5 12.2-13.1 13.1-13.7
Hydraulic 5.6 5.0 5.7-5.8 5.6
New fuel
s
0.2 2.5 1.6-2.6 3.5
To help reduce the risks of reduced oil supplies,
Japan became a member of the International Energy Program.
The program was formed in 1974 (as a result of the 19 73 oil
crisis) , is comprised of Japan, the US, most NATO countries,
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Australia, and New Zealand, and is designed to provide
24
mutual oil support during crises periods. Japan's oil
stockpiling goals have become quite ambitious over the last
decade. Oil stockpiling policies come under the auspices
of MITI and stockpiles are maintained primarily at commer-
cial sites vice dedicated government sites. At the time
of the 19 73 oil crisis, MITI had been "suggesting" that 45-
day oil stockpiles be maintained. After the oil crisis,
the Petroleum Stockpiling Law of 1975 established a 90-day
goal, to be achieved by 1980. The following estimated
figures show that actual "days of emergency oil reserves
on hand" have consistently lagged behind goals, but signifi-
cant progress in building reserves has taken place:
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
days 21 29 31 35 38 45
In 19 78, the Japan National Oil corporation was formed
(under government management) and was directed to attain a
13-day stockpile of oil reserves Cin addition to the 90-day
25
requirement levied on the commercial companies 1
.
Japan also has stockpile programs for certain minerals.
Copper, zinc, and aluminum have been routinely stockpiled
in the past and in December 1981, Japan approved a new 10-
day stockpile program for chromium, molybdenum, nickel, and
26tungsten.
The fact that Japan sets specific goals and target
dates for resource usage and supplies, yet not for attainment
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of military capabilities, suggests something about Japan's
priorities with respect to security. While its stockpiling
programs are certainly aimed at protecting the welfare of
the nation during shortage periods such as the 19 73 oil
crisis, its willingness to postpone target dates and ease
policies due to current low oil costs, reflects a lack of
serious concern over supply lines being interdicted.
E. JAPAN-US DEFENSE COOPERATION
Japan and the US have participated in various security
consultative committees since the MST was adopted. Most
of these have avoided tackling difficult security problems
but rather deal -with reviewing the Status of Forces Agreement
or sometimes take the form of lecture sessions by the US.
However, in 1976, the Subcommittee on Defense Cooperation
was created and assigned to draft an outline to facilitate
joint operations between US and SDF forces. In 1978, the
subcommittee presented the Guidelines for Japn-US Defense
Cooperation which were subsequently approved by Japan's
National Defense Council and Cabinet. The Guidelines set
forth recommendations to improve US-Japan cooperation on
defense matters and address such areas as joint planning
for emergency situations, improvement of coordination and
communications, intelligence sharing, and logistics planning.
The Guidelines paved the way for a new emphasis on combined
training. Though the MSDF has routinely conducted training
with the US Navy since 19 55, such has not been the case for
the other two defense forces and their US counterparts.
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In 19 78, the ASDF commenced training exercises with the
US Air Force and between 19 78-81, participated in 36 combined
training sessions involving figher tactics, reconnaissance,
and search and rescue training. GSDF training with US
forces did not occur until 19 81 when a communications
exercise and command post exercise were conducted. Actual
maneuvers between GSDF and US Army units were first held
in November 19 82 near Mt. Fuji. The exercise scenario cen-
tered on the popular theme of repelling an invasion of
Hokkaido.
The largest US-Japan combined exercise took place in the
vicinity of Japan from September 25-October 5, 19 83. Be-
sides US forces, 30,000 SDF personnel, 117 SDF aircraft,
and over 50 MSDF ships participated. The exercise was de-
signed to practice straits control (Tsushima and Tsugaru)
,
2 6plus an emergency deployment of forces to Hokkaido (the
popular scenario again) . The benefits of these combined
exercises are numerous, but in particular, they increase
understanding between SDF and US forces, and actually prac-
tice emergency coordination rather than just talk about it.
This represents a greater Japanese commitment to and accep-
tance of US defense policy since the late 1970's. This
training cannot but help elevate the defense readiness
posture of Japan and based on the scenarios being exercised,




In September 1982, Japan signed an agreement to permit
the US to deploy approximately 50 F-16 fighter aircraft to
Misawa (northern Honshu) between 19 85-88. The USSR immedi-
ately objected and in its official protest to Japan indicated
that the Soviets "would view the appearance of US planes
with an increased range of action and nuclear capability near
Soviet borders as a hostile step posing an immediate threat
27to the security of the Soviet Union." The Japanese govern-
ment's rejection of the Soviet protest and intention to allow
deployment of the F-16*s as scheduled indicates at least
tacit reqognition of the need to counter the formidable
Soviet air strike capability.
A 19 83 Asahi article reported that the US uses Japanese
territory from which to stage 15 intelligence collecting
2 8
aircraft, including 3 SR-71 Blackbirds and 10 RC-135*s.
The apparent acceptance by the Japanese government of these
aircraft operations in Japan insinuates that the government
makes stronger contributions to counter USSR capabilities than
it reveals to its public.
Another plus for US-Japan defense efforts was marked
by Prime Minister Nakasone s announcement in January 19 83
that Japanese defense technology could be made available to
the US. If this is effected (no memorandum of understanding
has yet been concluded) , this will provide for a mutual flow
of technology for the first time. While some in the US claim
there will be great interest in such Japanese materials as
fiber optics, ferrite paint, and microchips, the primary
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objective of mutually shared technology is to establish an
opportunity for technological cooperation which would facili-
29tate joint research and development at lower costs.
Japan-US defense cooperation has been stepped up con-
siderably since 19 78. While in some ways it may be viewed
as appeasement of the US, it also allows Japan the least
objectionable way to improve its defense capabilities.
F. DEFENDING THE SEA LANES
In early 19 78, the JDA estimated that the ASDF could
provide air cover for MSDF units out to about 90 nautical
miles. With growing concern over Soviet airpower in Northeast
Asia, the JDA began studies on the construction of four 10-15,000
ton aircraft carriers in order to extend air defense coverage
for the MSDF. The proposal envisioned that the carriers
would carry V/STOL aircraft and that one carrier would be
assigned to each of the four MSDF fleets. This study
probably resulted from efforts by the MSDF to introduce
aircraft carriers into its defense structure. Though this
concept apparently fizzled out, measures were soon initiated
to upgrade AAW capabilities on MSDF units (as discussed
earlier in this chapter) . That such programs were being
studied in 1978 also gives some indication that the JDA was
considering a greater "blue-water" role for the MSDF.
When US Secretary of Defense Weinberger met with Japan's
Foreign Minister in March 19 81, he explained that he did not
see US responsibilities in the vicinity of Japan as encompassing
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sea lane defense. Japan's response came two months later
during Prime Minister Susuki's visit to Washington when he
expressed that Japan could defend its sea lanes within 1000
miles of its shores. Once the statement was made, the US
was satisfied, Prime Minister Suzuki went back to Japan, and
little else concrete happened. Then in January 19 83 when
Prime Minister Nakasone visited Washington, he made the
following statement: "For the ocean our defense should
extend several hundred miles and if we are to establish sea
lanes then our desire would be to defend the sea lanes be-
tween Guam and Tokyo and between the Strait of Taiwan and
31Osaka" (my emphasis) . The importance of these two sea
routes should be readily apparent since most of Japan's
oil imports travel along the southwestern sea lane and over
half of Japan's total strategic resources arrive via the
32
southern sea route from the Southwest Pacific.
In May 19 83, responding to a query from within the Upper
House, the Nakasone Cabinet defined the objective of sea
lane defense as the protection of maritime traffic to support
Japan during an emergency situation such that prolonged ccm-
33bat could be supported if necessary. The recently released
19 83 Defense White Paper also refers to this, issue by stating
that Japan's defense requirements extend to "a radius of
several hundred miles of Japan and, in case of armed attack
34
on the country, protecting sea routes for about 1000NM "
(my emphasis) . Though defense of the sea lanes has not yet
been fully defined, it appears from the above statements that
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Japan's interests cover just two particular sea lanes (not
the waters between the sea lanes) and that Japan's support
for these sea lanes out to 1000 NM will not materialize
until after hostilities have commenced. A US-Japan joint
study group began working on the sea lane defense issue in
March 19 83 and is scheduled to complete its study by the
end of the year. Topics under review include threat analy-
sis, proposed responses to likely threats, types of forces




It has been estimated that in a time of conflict Japan
would minimally need to maintain a flow of 1/3 of its normal
imports to meet minimum needs (including defense require-
ments) . The threats to the two sea lanes previously mentioned
could consist of Soviet air, surface, and/or submarine units.
All have the capability to interdict Japan's sea lanes. While
a sea lane defense philosophy is still "officially" under
study, other developments hint that some sense of direction
already exists. In January 19 83, Japan and the US agreed to
build "marine environment observation facilities" at White
Beach, Okinawa. The purpose of the project is reportedly
3 6
to support ASW operations. These facilities, located on
the east coast of Okinawa and looking out over both sea lanes
previously mentioned should directly support submarine
detection operations in these areas.
Along with acknowledging some responsibility for sea
lane defense, the Prime Minister and some senior Defense
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personnel have voiced their support for the idea of the SDF
blocking the straits around Japan in time of an emergency
(Tsushima, Tsugaru, and Soya) . Acceptance of this role was
exemplified by MSDF Chief of Staff ADM Maeda in February
19 83, when he informed a press conference that the objectives
of such a mission for Japan would be to: 1) block enemy
submarines from exiting the Sea of Japan, 2) obstruct the
passage of enemy warships, and that 3) 30% blockage would be
37
considered effective. Though he did not comment on the
means to be used in blocking the straits, Joint Staff Coun-
cil Chairman ADM Yata foresees the laying of mines coupled
with the use of hydrophone arrays (on the ocean bottom) provid-
ing submarine locating information to surface combatants
and aircraft patrolling the area. 8 The JDA in February
19 83 recommended that the new C-130H aircraft being procured
from the US be equipped with minelaying capabilities (Japan's
P-3C's and P-2j's currently are so equipped). The Agency
also requested permission to routinely station a surveillance
ship in the Soya Strait as had already been done in the
39Tsushima and Tsugaru Straits. An MSDF ship does now
monitor the Soya Strait.
Despite the fact that the SDF has more concrete plans
and is better prepared to carry out the mission of blocking
straits than defending 1000 NM sea lanes, problems remain.
ADM Yata makes the important point that mining a strait is
a major government decision and that it is not logical to
believe that this would automatically be accomplished if
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hostilities commenced between the US and USSR. Furthermore,
because of the "exclusively defensive" orientation of Japan,
a blockade is not envisioned until an attack has been made
40
on Japan . Coming from the leading SDF officer whose con-
cern about the Soviets probably exceeds most Japanese,
these comments should make it clear to observers that even
though Japan may be in the Western camp, threats to the
US do not necessarily equate to threats to Japan. Another
related factor which reveals less than pressing concern over
"bottling up" the Soviets, stems from an estimate that many
of Japan's mines are not ready for immediate use and may re-
41quire months to prepare for service.
Even if defending the sea lanes within 1000 NM does soon
emerge as a well-defined mission of the SDF, it does not
signify a strong response to a perceived Soviet threat.
The US has been leaning on Japan for some time to adopt this
responsibility as part of a "division of labor" scheme. Thus
the response appears more a result of US pressure than Soviet
pressure. Moreover, Japan's tardiness in acquiring the assets
to independently carry out this mission, reflects minimial
belief that the USSR would actually use direct force against
Japan
.
G. REFLECTIONS ON DEFENSE WEAKNESSES
Weaknesses reveal the flaws in a nation's defense capa-
bilities. Numerous weaknesses exist in Japan's defense
structure. Some have resulted from legal restrictions,
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some from public pressure, and some from neglect. Those
defense weaknesses which relate to concern (or lack of con-
cern) for the Soviet "threat" are summarized below.
1) Japan has no anti-espionage laws. If defense secrets
are stolen, the culprit can only be charged with theft and
might face a prison sentence of about one year. Even with
recently publicized incidents such as the Levchenko and
Vinogradov case, no serious move has been initiated to
establish an anti-espionage law.
2) Contact between the three defense forces until recent
years was minimal. An integrated exercise with all three
forces had not been held until 19 81. No joint command struc-
ture exists and each defense force works directly for the
Director General of the JDA. Integrated plans are not estab-
lished for equipment procurement nor are integrated plans in
place for handling actual emergency situations. It is diffi-
cult to imagine that a country which viewed another as a
realistic threat would not ensure that military operations
could be executed with maximum coordination and efficiency.
3) Long range communications and EW capabilities are
deficient.
4) Logistics support (including airlift and sealift
capabilities) depends heavily on civilian components and are
inadequate to support sustained operations. Nearly all
supplies are transported by civilian carriers who normally
make little extra effort to support defense needs. Even in
a time of conflict, there are no provisions for civilian
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shippers to give priority to the JDA. Within the SDF,
current logistics capabilities are extremely limited and
cannot support SDF units over an extended period or at any
distance from Japan. As an example, the MSDF has only two
oilers available to provide at-sea refueling for all its
naval units.
5) Ammunition supplies are low. In I9 60, Japan possessed
140,000 tons of ammunition. By 1978, these quantities fell
to 70,000 tons (much of this decrease may have resulted
from retiring old ammunition) . During security talks in
19 78, the US expressed its concern that the SDF possessed
less than two weeks supply of ammunition even though a one
42
month supply stood as the goal to be maintained. Until
19 80, no torpedoes were carried aboard MSDF ships nor were
any missiles carried by ASDF aircraft. As of May 19 83,
Japan's ammunition still remained insufficient to support
current weapons systems for more than two weeks of operations
(about 80,000 tons). The JDA has voiced its concern that
quantities should be increased to a one month supply as
43
soon as possible, but the fact remains that negligible
increases have occurred in the last 5 years despite marked
changes in Soviet military capabilities in the region.
6) Though the GSDF would most likely be needed to oppose
an amphibious assault, its equipment poorly supports such a




7) MSDF AAW capabilities are weak due to relatively few
installed systems. Improvements are being made as noted
earlier. In the area of ASW, the MSDF has reasonable detec-
tion capabilities considering the size of the fleet. However,
its attack capabilities are currently nil due to not only
a paucity of torpedoes but also the fact that most of the
torpedoes currently in stock have poor capabilities against
a high speed nuclear submarine.
8) The SDF lacks sufficient capabilities to detect or
combat enemy aircraft approaching Japan. The 2 8 radar sites
around Japan which make up the BADGE system (Basic Air
Defense Ground Environment) have been in use since the 1960's.
They have poor detection capabilities against supersonic low
flyers, can be easily jammed, and are virtually unprotected
(as are Japan's air bases) . Though work is underway to
improve BADGE, it will be a lengthy process. Japan was
void of any AEW systems until the recent procurement of two
E-2C's from the US. Additionally, Japan's ground-to-air
missile sights CHAWK and NIKE) are aging and capabilities
against high speed aircraft are questionable. Some of these
missiles will be replaced with improved versions in the up-
coming years. Most Japanese fighters do not have inflight-
refueling equipment installed (.another system previously
evaluated as "offensive") which severely limits the time they
can continuously stay aloft. In addition, missile supplies
44
may not even last for 5 sorties per plane.
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9) Actual defense capabilities do not meet implied de-
fense capabilities. The Chairman of the Joint Staff Coun-
cil remarked in July 1980 that even if Japan met its 19 84
defense improvement goals, it would not be able to stop a
45
"small-scale, limited aggression."
In spite of these defense weaknesses which still face
Japan, significant qualitative improvements have taken
place. Through its current acquisition and building pro-
gram, Japan now possesses some of the world's finest mili-
tary equipment and the necessary training to effectively use
this equipment. Quantitative shortages represent the primary
remaining equipment deficiency which can be corrected much
easier and more rapidly than the other two factors (quality
and training)
.
Greater emphasis is being placed on MSDF and ASDF im-
provements which seems to indicate a better appreciation
of most likely types of military action against Japan.
Moreover, the significant efforts taken since 19 78 to estab-
lish an operational framework (vice just plans on paper),
for joint US-Japan defense procedures, has produced a
respectable deterrent force in which Japan plays an integral
role. While Japan's defense improvements may remain incre-
mental, the government's defense moves have been more





The Commander-in-Chief of US Forces in the Pacific
(CINCPAC) commented in June 19 83 that "the Soviet threat is
perceived essentially the same by both the US and Japan.
The difference is in the urgency of the need to meet the
threat..." The preceding chapters have attempted to demon-
strate that the differences in US and Japanese perceptions
of the Soviet threat are a bit more extensive and complex
than indicated in the above statement. When one talks of
Japanese perceptions of the Soviet "threat," he must talk
in the plural, for a singular line of thought does not exist.
Further complexities arise in attempting to evaluate Japanese
attitudes because of the Japanese tendency to be less than
frank when addressing controversial issues.
After reviewing Soviet military capabilities in the
Northeast Asia region, it is apparent that the Soviets could
readily carry out a massive conventional and/or nuclear attack
on Japan. And yet, in a country which suffered defeat in
the last world war, which dedicated itself to domestic
development and non-military factors in its foreign relations,
and which has prospered while under the protection of a
security pact with a major power, it has proved difficult
for many Japanese to visualize a military threat to their
country. Due to this unique environment in the postwar
period, Japan became accustomed to its limited participatory
14 6

role in defense matters. As a result, Japan fell into the
"observer syndrome" for many years. This led Japan to be-
come reaction-oriented on defense matters. Repeatedly,
Japanese comments on various security issues conclude with
remarks such as "we must watch these events closely." As
a result, the Japanese have tended to observe developing
situations until forced to react. As Masataka Kosaka puts
it:
The Japanese seldom try to change or create the
international environment, but simply adapt them-
selves to it. Therefore, although shocked when the
environment changes radically, they quickly resign
themselves to fate and adapt successfully to the
new situation. Thus, occasional shocks play a
healthy role in Japan, for otherwise she would stay
in what might be called 'imraobilism. '
2
Japanese perceptions of the Soviet threat cannot be
neatly packaged. Until recent years, most Japanese saw
little threat to their country. Even among Japanese leading
officials, concern about the Soviets was low. The foremost
opposition parties claim there is nothing to fear from the
Soviets. Japanese businessmen prefer to concentrate on the
economic gains available from the USSR. The scholars have
mixed views but are only recently emerging as an audible voice
in Japan. The public masses have resembled sleeping child-
ren with respect to defense issues—they have lacked concern
due to a certain sense of immunity. The only threats they
have been able to recognize are those impacting on economic
lifelines, such as during the 1973 oil crisis. The Japanese
people have reached economic prosperity and they want to
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preserve this prosperity, but the majority do not equate
personal affluence with the survival of the nation. Though
the people have come to accept and support the existence of
the SDF, they do not see a need to spend additional funds to
expand it. One of the most striking things in reviewing
public opinion polls on security issues is the large propor-
tion of "don't know" or "no comment" answers. This suggests
that a significant degree of apathy remains among the general
populace. Kiichi Miyazawa accurately describes this paradox
of the public:
We witness now in Japan some growth of public opinion
in support of self-defense efforts and of our security
ties with America. And yet no national concensus
exists on the need for a steady and substantial
improvement in the nation's defense capabilities.
There is still little public awareness that Japan
should participate in the concerted efforts of
America and its alliance partners to maintain a glo-
bal military balance in order to defend our basic
values of freedom and democracy.-*
In the US, "defense" has frequently been used as a
rallying point to "do whatever is necessary" regardless of
constraining factors. In Japan, defense issues have not
stood for a similar driving force. Instead, constraints have
been foremost considered, then decisions made based on these
constraints. The impact (and frustrations) of these con-
straints are mirrored in these comments on the defense
budget by JDA Director General Tanikawa in March 19 83:
...when we think about the future, I have a feeling
that, even from the standpoint of attainment of the
level of the Defense Plan General Outline [NDPO] at
an early date, we have been forced to slow down our
pace... There was nothing we could do , in the light
of the present financial circumstances, but I think
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we must make efforts to catch up a little more, if the
financial situation turns favorable even by a little
in fiscal 1984 and after 4
. (My emphasis)
Inspite of the aforementioned factors, shifts in atti-
tudes towards the USSR do appear to be taking place.
These ongoing shifts have been primarily stimulated by the
Japan-China Friendship Treaty, perceived changes in the US-
USSR military balance, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,
and the SS-20 missile issue. The Japan-China Friendship
Treaty enabled Japan to remove China from its "potential
threat" list which allowed it to focus more attention on
its problems with the USSR. Furthermore, adverse Soviet
reaction to the treaty (in particular, the rapid military
buildup in the vicinity of Japan) increased Japanese aware-
ness of proximate Soviet military power. As the expansion
of Soviet forces continued, confidence in the infallibility
of the US protective shield began slowly eroding. The
invasion of Afghanistan had important psychological impact
on the Japanese. It created a greater sense of insecurity
about the USSR and doubts about Soviet international ambi-
tions. As publicity increased about SS-20 missiles in Asia
(especially after Soviet comments that some European mis-
siles might be shifted to Asia) , more Japanese began to
realize that other vulnerabilities existed besides just
economic dependencies.
Even though national security concerns are slowly on
the rise, the Japanese are reluctant to take decisive
action until they perceive that conditions are exactly
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right. A change in mood must precede the desire to act
and usually involves a long process. This need to estab-
lish appropriate moods prior to taking action is well under-
c.
stood by Japan's political leaders. Though Prime Minister
Nakasone seems to clearly recognize a Soviet "threat,"
he is an exception among past prime ministers. He has
confronted the Soviets head-on regarding security issues and
seems intent on raising the level of public concern over
security matters and demonstrating that economics and diplo-
macy alone are not sufficient in dealing with a country
like the USSR. In his attempts to alter the public mood
to conform more to his own thinking, he aims at the Japanese
core by reminding people of such essential intangibles as
"pride," "dignity," and "respect." The results remain to
be seen. When a tangible "barrier" is overcome, such as the
1% ceiling on defense spending, it will represent a sincere
recognition of the Soviet threat Cand/or a response to US
pressure)
.
Meanwhile, those leaders in government who do hold a
healthy respect for the Soviet threat, will continue to
quietly work to sharpen Japan's defense capabilities.
Japans' acquisition programs to attain modern weapons sys-
tems and its increased defense cooperation with the US sug-
gest that a certain sense of urgency does exist in some
circles of government. Additionally, the government's
initiatives to expand security concerns beyond its own
borders, such as defending sea lanes, involving itself in
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international INF problems, and establishing security dis-
7
cussions with the ROK, symbolize new dimensions in Japan's
security outlook.
The US should not expect Japan to unconsciously embrace
American views of the Soviet "threat," but it can provide
a constant flow of objective data on the Soviets, demon-
strate a sincere interest to tackle common problems jointly
,
and allow Japan to form its own opinions. Currently, the
majority of Japanese do not perceive the Soviets as posing
a serious threat to Japan. However, Japanese perceptions
and reactions to the Soviet "threat" are in transition.
This transition is being led by a growing group of elites,
both within and outside of the government, who recognize
the need for Japan to develop a respectable defense posture
in order to preclude intimidation by any country. If these
"wise men" are successful in their endeavors, the US will




BASIC POLICY FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE
The objective of national defense is to prevent direct
and indirect aggression, but once invaded, to repel such
aggression, thereby preserving the independence and peace
of Japan founded upon democratic principles.
To achieve this objective, the Government of Japan here-
by establishes the following principles:
1. To support the activities of the United Nations,
and promote international cooperation, thereby contributing
to the realization of world peace.
2. To stabilize the public welfare and enhance the
people's love for the country, thereby establishing the
sound basis essential to Japan's security.
3. To develop progressively the effective defense capa-
bilities necessary for self-defense, with due regard to the
nation's resources and the prevailing domestic situation.
4
.
To deal with external aggression on the basis of
the Japan-U.S. security arrangements, pending more effec-
tive functioning of the United Nations in future deterring
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